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THE TEMPLATE for TERRORISM at PORT ARTHUR authored jointly by The Jasher Team Introduction This is a brief exposure of what arguably amounts to a story largely ignored by mainland Australians, until the massacre at Port Arthur. In examining this story, we shall revisit certain incidents that singularly while obnoxious to most, when related collectively, - even as briefly as we are confined to do - may be epitomized in the evil which in April of 1996, made Port Arthur yet again infamous. Just four months after the massacre at Port Arthur and in August of 1996, Richard McCreadie succeeded John Johnson as Commissioner over the 1100 officers who make up Tasmania Police. Richard McCreadie, born April 22nd, 1946, joined the Tasmania Police at the age of 18 years, on 15 October 1964. After the 2003 traditional Queen's Birthday weekend honours list was announced, Hobart's Mercury reported that he was named, 'an Officer of the Order of Australia (AO)'. They quoted him stating, "I head up the most outstanding team of people in Tasmania -- Tasmania Police and the Department of Police and Public Safety," and gave credit to those who supported him, over what he termed, "…a very long and sometimes difficult career." The article further confirmed him as, "Head of Police Operations during one of the most difficult times ever faced by Tasmania Police -- the Port Arthur massacre". As a result of that team effort he oversaw, "People right across the world were in awe of the response that a relatively small jurisdiction was able to mount," he said. "I will be eternally proud of that response." This narrative briefly covers nearly 40 years of Mr. McCreadie in policing Tasmania, with 'the nation's lowest crime rate'. As Tassie's 'top cop' says: "I'm still enjoying it. I'll be around for a while yet." We shall not embellish the narrative: it does not require such treatment. Merely we will assemble the daily newspaper accounts, inquiry transcripts, and the public record of words of the various players who have numbered among this "most outstanding team of people" Richard McCreadie alluded to in the article by Danny Rose in The Mercury of Hobart 9 June 2003, above. This is not a "witch-hunt" against any one person, but it is inevitable, that in Richard McCreadie - a Tasmanian Policeman for nearly forty years - he will figure in these incidents which stretch across the last 12 of those years of Tasmania's policing history. The incidents we will address in this narrative are:
1. The Terrorist Attack at Port Arthur of April 1996, 2. The "telephone tapping affair" of July 1994, 3. The dismissal of Sergt. Helen Cameron, 1997, 4. The SOG shooting of Joseph Gilewicz of July 1991, revisited in October 2000, 5. The Nancy Grunwaldt (12 March 1983), and Victoria Cafasso (11 October 1995) mysteries, and 6. The Raymond Charlton v Wendy Scurr, Writ of 30 August, 2001.
Chapter 1: WON BY TRIFLES, BETRAYED BY DECEIT Two weeks of miserable, unremitting rain, had given way that Sunday to warm autumn sunshine, and the Port Arthur Historic Site was filled with a happy throng of tourists, enjoying the tranquillity, as they milled about the Information Centre, awaiting directions from friendly tour guides and staff, or simply enjoying an informal lunch. Wendy Scurr had just told her supervisor of the need for an extra ferry trip to cope with increase that day - many North American tourists among them. At the Information Centre, Mrs Scurr was distracted from her lunch, by a disturbing thumping noise which erupted and materialised into gunshots from inside the Broad Arrow Café. The first plea for assistance made to Police in Hobart came from the Port Arthur Historic Site Information Centre, when tour guide, Mrs Wendy Scurr dialled 000, logged at 1332 [1.32pm], that Sunday, April 28th 1996. Site security officer and car park attendant Ian Kingston, made a second call logged at 1335 [1.35pm], and 471 Tasmania Police personnel were tasked to respond. 1 Contrary to the official line, the first of 'the outstanding team' to arrive at Port Arthur, was former Nubeena policeman, Const Chris Iles, at that time stationed at the Sorell. He attended the Kodak Shop, at about 1348 [1.48pm], and spoke to witnesses Jim Laycock and Kyle Spruce. After inspecting quickly the deceased female, Zoe Hall, in the white Corolla, he abruptly departed in his police vehicle at high speed in a northerly direction, on the Arthur highway towards Dunalley, and is never mentioned in any of the documentation again. The community knew Chris Iles well, but here he breached their trust, and abandoned them. What caused Chris Iles' rapid, bizarre, withdrawal and - disappearance? 2 On the other hand, Richard McCreadie explains, "The first police arrived at 1412 [2.12pm] and confirmed activity at Seascape and the burning BMW." 3 Here he's referring to Constables Garry Whittle of Dunalley, and Paul Hyland of Nubeena, the former being the first policeman to come under fire from the terrorist gunmen inside Seascape. However, in direct conflict with Mr. McCreadie's statement, one of this "outstanding team", SOG team leader Sgt Andrew Fogarty was already there in the area. Although the Arthur Highway was sealed, Fogarty makes the unbelievable claim of having driven himself over its narrow, twisting, undulating alignment, from the Bellerive Police Station to Seascape, a trip of around 90 km in just 43 minutes! Sgt. Fogarty further claimed, "At about 4.00 pm Senior Sergeant MORRISON arrived at my location..," about 330m north of the Seascape entrance, "and I gave him a detailed briefing…" 4 The first SOG team was "tasked and proceeding" by helicopter at 1557 (3.57pm), but Snr. Sgt. Morrison was not on that aircraft. He accompanied the second contingent which departed by road at 1604 (4.04pm). Here you can see the deceit of the Fogarty claim. Two witnesses, whom we choose not to name, were informed by a Task Force member, that a certain SOG fired a phosphorus grenade into the BMW, which burned. That fire destroyed the forensic evidence which would have ruled-out Martin Bryant as ever having occupied the BMW. Oh, and the same SOG device was used to ignite the Seascape Cottage inferno. 5 Sgt. Fogarty also played a key role in an incident which occurred at Seascape at about 1630 (4.30pm). Constables Garry Whittle and Pat Allen, outside the grounds of Seascape, and by radio, twice requested from some higher authority, "We have the Port Arthur gunman in sight. Permission to shoot". This was an attempt to halt a gunman's actions which were a threat to the life of Sally Martin, who, naked and screaming was being pursued around the cottage yard. Monitored by SES personnel, a senior police officer was heard to respond, "Permission denied this has to happen." If the female was not Sally Martin, then who? 6 A manager for PAHS, Andrew Simmons and his wife, just over the highway from Seascape was awaiting a colleague's arrival at the arranged time of 11.00am. Simmons states clearly, "…it was prior to 11 AM I was in my front yard with my wife. …I heard very clearly two shots ring out." 7 The DPP deliberately mislead the Chief Justice by distorting these times. The DPP promoted Doug McCutcheon's imprecise account over that of Andrew Simmons, even promoting the 3 shots as a 'volley' of shots. Mr. Simmons' positive estimation of time - 'prior to 11am' - was promoted by Mr. Bugg as 'at about midday', and further lead the DPP to state, "In that late morning…the Crown case is that Bryant shot Mr. and Mrs. Martin at about that time," 8 Damien Bugg's statements to the court were never tested under oath or challenged by Bryant's Defence Counsel, John Avery…how convenient is that? But remember, Sally Martin was still alive five and a half hours after Mr. Simmons heard two shots ring out. However, Sally Martin was not shot, instead, cause of death was determined as caused by a 'depressed skull fracture'. 9 Even more bizarre is the fact, that at approximately 1100 (11.00am), the proprietor of the Shell Service Station at Sorell, Garry King, was chatting to Martin Bryant as he supped a cup of coffee, 50 minutes by road away from Seascape! 10 We are further informed of yet a second sighting of Martin Bryant at the wheel of his yellow Volvo driving through Eaglehawk Neck. 11 So, who murdered David Martin in the forenoon of 28 April, 1996? The Mercury quotes Deputy Commissioner Luppo Prins as stating, 'the first helicopter arrived at Port Arthur at 2.56 pm', to ferry wounded to the Royal Hobart Hospital. Aboard were two unarmed Constables as crew, Brian Edmonds and Damian Bidgood, whose duties restricted them to stay with the aircraft. After seeing the chaos and devastation, Edmonds was reported in The Mercury as having contacted the Hobart Major Incident Room, pleading, "For Christ's sake, get some f…… police down here!" But his plea was ignored, why? At the Historic Site, Craig Coombs explains, "A senior police officer arrived on Site …and took control of the crime scene." In fact from his own staff records, we know he is referring to Det. Peter Hesman, armed with a service issue revolver, and who's arrival at the Historic Site tollbooth was logged at 1626 [4.26pm]. His vehicle and of course the driver, departed 4 minutes later…why? Single-handedly, Det. Hesman could not secure the site's 4 crime scenes at the Historic Site, and to any degree assist the 500 plus tourists and staff there! Mr. Coombs was informed 3 helicopter loads of SOG's were on their way, so he commandeered 3 four-wheel drives and had them standing by at the oval to ferry these promised officers to the site. However when the single helicopter landed, just two young, unarmed, female constables fresh from the academy and off the beat in Hobart alighted, and later they were ordered to guard the corpses there over the entire hours of darkness to prevent animal attack. 12 One of several Historic Site staff member states; "At about 6.30pm that night I was on the veranda of CLOUGHA with Brian ALISON and John FEATHERSTONE fellow workers at the site. All three of us heard three shots..," close by. 13 Detective Peter Hesman later while seated in the Motel lounge room shortly after 6.30 pm, was spoken to by Mrs Wendy Scurr who remembers him loading his service pistol under the table and out of sight of the throng of traumatised visitors and staff sheltering there. 14 According to the DPP, Martin Bryant - the claimed 'lone gunman' - at this time had been under siege inside Seascape for 4hrs and 18 minutes! Who fired these 3 gunshots? Why was this incident never investigated with appropriate vigour by Richard McCreadie's "most outstanding team"? In official documents, no time is recorded of when Police were tasked in strength from Taranna to proceed to the Historic Site. Thankfully, Coroner, Ian Matterson tells us he had to break his journey to Port Arthur at the Taranna PFC Post as it was, "…not safe for entry". His party was delayed and they, "…waited until 1930 [7.30pm] before [they] obtained the 'all clear'." 15 In summary, on the Tasman Peninsula on 28 April, 1996, an "…environment of trauma created by the event …, a prevailing atmosphere of fear, confusion and panic..," was deliberately extended by those in authority which in consequence, directly impacted upon the estimated 500-800 people, visitors, PAHSMA staff, State Ambulance, Emergency Services, Fire Brigade volunteers and even some unarmed Police, after the initial 000 calls were received by Hobart Police Headquarters beginning at 1.32pm - for six hours! On the ground, it was the volunteers who carried the day. Where was McCreadie's "most outstanding team"? 16 Then there's the media contingent who require your consideration also: "In order to satisfy the media requirements a strategic plan was devised…" Contingencies were well in hand with, "…New South Wales and Victorian Police … requested to assist and provided experienced police media officers to support Tasmania Police Media Officer Geoff Easton and Government Media Liaison Officer Peter Hazlewood." On the afternoon of 28 April, the authorities seconded various buses and used them to ferry police and counsellors in, and conversely to ferry survivors out to the Police Academy at Rokeby where they were counselled, and their police statements taken. The following morning the same buses were utilised to ferry the world media journalists around the various crime scenes from Seascape Cottage to the Broad Arrow Café at the Port Arthur Historic Site. Coroner, Mr. Ian Matterson, observed that, "the concept of the bus tour both amazed and pleased the media contingent." This 'pleasing concept' was attributed to Peter Hazelwood, the Security Advisory Committee for Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV) trained, former ASIO agent who was at the time, in the employ of Premier, Hon. Ray Groom's Media Office. 17 The second media man in the "most outstanding team," was Mr. Geoff Easton BA Dip Teach, Manager Public Affairs, and a Tasmania Police officer. Likewise, Geoff Easton was SAC-PAV trained, having just a fortnight before spent, "five days in Western Australia on a Sac Pav Exercise, 'Top Shelf'…". Strangely, or in truth not so strangely, in a phone call to Easton at about 1420 (4.20pm), it was Hazelwood who made the policeman Easton aware of, "some shooting at Port Arthur." Again in the words of Geoff Easton, he explains that "We agreed that he [Hazelwood] would immediately make the hour and a quarter drive to Pt Arthur to control the media at the Police Forward Command Post…," at Taranna, while Easton remained in the Major Incident Room at Hobart. 18 Much later, and in Adelaide, South Australia, Geoff Easton appeared before the Senate Select Committee on Information Technologies on 27 April, 1998, chaired by Sen. Jeannie Ferris. Also in that committee were John Quirke (S.A.) and Senator for Tasmania, Brian Harradine. Mr. Easton answered a number of their questions, directly relating to the media and their behaviour during the Port Arthur Massacre and the aftermath. In his own words, he explains, "By drip-feeding the media we have some hold on the information that is being conveyed to the rest of the public." And because of the public record of this select Parliamentary Committee of inquiry, it would seem his method of "drip-feeding" was not confined to the media and the public! For when Senator Quirke asked Geoff Easton: "Has the coronial inquest into this episode happened yet?" Mr. Easton replied, "Yes, that is complete." Here, Mr. Easton deliberately mislead the Parliamentary Senate Select Committee … and by so doing the Commonwealth Parliament! 19 At this Senate hearing incidentally, and concerning the Coronial Inquiry, Senator Harradine had been informed in writing that no such coronial inquiry had been held! The Easton - Hazlewood partnership, exposed by the Port Arthur incident, is now well cemented, as they've been teamed-up yet again in the Tasmania Police, as partners in the National Missing Persons Unit. 20 Martin Bryant's counsel at his remand hearing on 22 May 1996, was Phillip Zeeman of the firm, Gunson, Pickard and Hann. But by the 4 July 1996, David Gunson had taken over, and it was he who consented to Det. Insps. Paine and Warren conducting a video taped interrogation without any legal counsel or guardian present - contrary to law. 20 By 30 September, 1996, and against the advice of his legal counsel David Gunson, Mr. Bryant entered pleas yet again of "Not Guilty". Directly as a result of Bryant's insistence of his "Innocence", and at that juncture, Gunson withdrew. Born at St Helens, on Tasmania's Northeast coast in 1948, John Avery, primarily a criminal lawyer, then became Bryant's counsel. Herein a conflict of interest is exposed. For earlier in May of 1996, Mr. Terrence Hill had volunteered information to police, regarding events surrounding the receipt of a Colt AR10 Carbine at his gun shop premises. By early June the DPP, the Tasmania Police and Solicitor John Avery, conspired to coerce or intimidate Terry Hill into falsely admitting to a firearm offence, and confirmed this action by their offer in writing of "indemnity against prosecution", should Mr. Hill be prepared to accept that he did sell guns to Bryant. Avery was still speaking with Police in relation to matters pertaining to Terry Hill up until 31October 1996, at which time it was announced Bryant's pre-trial hearing was to be heard on 7 November, 1996. 22 And so after, 'sorting out a few technical issues,' John Avery represented Martin Bryant, a person with a low IQ who in a previous sitting of the same court was found incapable of managing his own affairs, because of his low intelligence. In so doing, John Avery has acted improperly in permitting his client, under these conditions to enter a plea of "Guilty". Likewise, his actions in this instance and those of his co-conspirators, the DPP and the Police in relation to the matter of Terry Hill could well be argued in a court of law as unconscionable at least, and most probably an attempt to pervert the course of justice. This is but a small part of an appalling episode. Premier Ray Groome, had already acted to 'freeze and seize' Bryant's $1.5m assets! A week later Mr. Hill was targeted by Police who revoked his Gun Dealer's licence, for what can only be described as alleged petty technical breaches. But the harassment continued, when thirteen months later and in July 1997, a taxpayer funded civil action was launched against Terry Hill by Neville Quinn, with Tasmania Legal Aid's solicitor Roland Browne as the plaintiff's lawyer . This outrageous litigation failed, but with still further associated events, Mr Hill's assets were targeted and his family's livelihood were destroyed. Terrence Hill and his wife are innocent of any wrong doing, regarding firearms and Martin Bryant, but they are no less victims of the terrorist attack at Port Arthur in 1996. Mr. Hill's good name remains stigmatised by the unconscionable actions of all five parties mentioned above, and there has never been an apology or recompense. So much for Mr. McCreadie and his "most outstanding team". 23 On 21 November 2002, a meeting convened by The Australian and New Zealand Forensic Science Society, was held at the Nathan Campus of Griffith University in Queensland. At an appropriate opportunity during question time, and through the chair, Mr. Ian McNiven asked a question of the guest speaker, Sergeant Gerard Dutton, Officer in Charge of Tasmania Ballistic Section, of the Tasmania Police and so one of Richard McCreadie's "most outstanding team". Mr. McNiven's question related directly to the forensic and ballistic investigation of the crime scene in the Broad Arrow Café at the Historic Site. He asked, "Was any solid empirical forensic evidence such as finger prints or DNA found that links Martin Bryant to the shootings in the café?" A concise question. For his trouble, and by what was hardly veiled threats of arrest, Mr. McNiven was forced to leave the meeting early, with his question unanswered. 24 For readers to have some comprehension as to the scope of treachery and systemic corruption that has sprouted in the greenhouse nursery - Tasmania - in the State and Federal environs of it's halls of power and authority from the 1980s, it requires you to consider examples that have manifest themselves in the following associated events recounted below. These events in various ways implicate the present hierarchy of Police, judiciary, legal profession, members of the parliaments and others into an extensive power cabal, which in the fullness of time of the 1990s is implicated in the entire terrorist attack that was the massacre at Port Arthur examined and exposed in that authoritative ongoing work by retired Victoria Policeman, Andrew MacGregor, entitled Deceit & Terrorism - the Massacre at Port Arthur. One final point requires attention regarding the massacre at Port Arthur: the date - the 28th April - is not coincidental. Many events which evidence violent, evil, macabre, acts to a similar degree as Port Arthur and which for centuries have occurred globally, are planned to occur centred around the last days of April. You the reader must prudently examine this plane fact much closer for your self. So let us now regress, to the year 1991. On July 15 of that year, the Tasmania Police Special Operations Group (SOG) "assault team" was ordered to deploy at Pelverata in an operation which saw their "senior sniper" shoot dead Joseph Gilewicz on the morning of 16 July 1991. Ten months later Coroner Mr. Matterson conducted a Coronial Inquest on 28 May 1992, into his death, handing down a finding that Mr. Gilewicz had been shot and killed by an SOG officer, "acting in self defence". Mr. Matterson was also the Port Arthur Coroner, but surrendered control of the Seascape crime scene to Insp. Warren at about 8.40am on April 29 and subsequently, although compelled by laws in place at the time to do so, failed to hold a coronial inquest into the deaths of the three deceased at Seascape. But the controversy surrounding the death of Joe Gilewicz did not diminish when the 1992 coronial inquest into his death concluded anyway. Across the State many people roiled with growing anger for another eight years and seven months. But we shall now briefly leave this affair and return to it in chronological order shortly. 25 Bibliography 1. The EMA Report, "An Overview of the Police Response", Richard McCreadie, pp.5-7. 2. Witness statements of: i.) James Clement LAYCOCK, 10/5/96; ii.) Kyle SPRUCE, 2/5/96. 3. Richard McCreadie, EMA report, at p.5. 4. Statement to prove, Andrew Mark FOGARTY, Sergt No. 1413. 5. Richard McCreadie, EMA report, p.6. 6. Const Paul HYLAND - Statement to prove; Sergt Andrew Mark FOGARTY, Statement to prove. 7. Andrew David SIMMONS, Witness statement, 4/5/96. 8. The Queen v Martin Bryant, Court trans., 20 November 1996, pp. 62-63. 9. ibid at p.187. 10. Gary John KING, Witness statement, 17/5/96. 11. The Queen v Martin Bryant, Court trans. at p.62; Mike Bingham - Suddenly one Sunday, pub Harper Collins 1996. 12. Craig Coombs, "Port Arthur Historic Site Management Authority Response", EMA report, p.40. 13. Witness statement, Lee-Anne GOODWIN, 2/5/96. 14. Interview, Mrs Wendy Scurr, June 1996. 15. Ian R. Matterson LL.B., Magistrate at Hobart - "Coroner's Responsibilities at Port Arthur", EMA Report, p.90. 16. McCreadie "Port Arthur - An Overview of the Police Response", EMA Report, p.6. 17. Geoff Easton BA Dip Teach; Matterson - "Port Arthur - Media Management", EMA Report, p.120. 18. ibid, p.120. 19. Select Senate Committee on Information Technologies, Commonwealth of Australia, papers, Adelaide 27/4/98. 20. The World Wide Web at http://www.missingpersons.info.au/MRMin.htm , 11/8/02 21. The Queen v Martin Bryant, Court transcript, pp. 190-191; Bronwen Hayes, "Threats and bomb Scare as video link beams Bryant into court", The Sydney Morning Herald, 22may96, p.2. 22. John W. Avery letter - to Terrence Hill; Mr. & Mrs Terry Hill - interview, Launceston, 29/5/02. 23. ibid. 24. Ian McNiven - "Threatened With Arrest for Asking a Forensic Question," (unpublished March, 2003), Nambour Qld. Mahoney Inquiry - 2000, "Report", Vol 1, "Introduction", p.1. 25. Richard McCreadie - "An Overview of the Police Response", EMA report, pp.5&7.
Chapter 2: WHO'LL BELL THE CAT?
In the intervening years, and before the massacre occurred at Port Arthur, senior officers of Tasmania Police were embroiled in an earlier controversy. From official parliamentary documents , we are informed that an internal inquiry was initiated first by Commissioner John Johnson into allegations of irregular actions by subordinate officers in the tracking of telephone call charges involving fellow officers. Johnson's inquiry had been in progress for some time it seems, when two letters dated the 6th and 7th of July 1994, arrived on the desk of Secretary of the Department of Justice, authored by the legal representative of "a senior officer" of Tasmania Police. The matter was referred to the DPP no later than Thursday July 7th by this circuitous route, for the reaction by the DPP, Damien Bugg QC was nothing short of electric. Almost as if investigatory arrangements were already in train, as the very next day - Friday 8th July 1994 - he informs us, "I commenced an inquiry into matters referred to me by the Secretary, Department of Justice…" Bugg also indicates he was earlier alerted to John Johnson's internal inquiry, and was 'awaiting receipt of material' from the Commissioner Johnson, in relation to the matter. 1 Now earlier in the autumn of 1994, Assistant Commissioner Richard Chugg, and a colleague Superintendent Cameron, had collaborated their energies and without the knowledge of Commissioner John Johnson, commenced to obtain phone call records of two senior fellow officers, Deputy Comm. Richard McCreadie, and Supt. Cashion. They initiated their action as a result of allegations examined by a drug bureau officer, Helen Cameron (no relation to the Superintendent above) and who's concerns and findings had been forwarded to these senior officers. It does appear from all the documentation available, that Helen Cameron must have been acting on allegations originally collected in the form of a Statutory Declaration made in April 1984, to the Drug Bureau, by a mystery informant, identified by Damien Bugg in his report only as a 'Tasmanian by birth', a certain "Mr. H" who it would seem, for reasons never explained, drug bureau officers believed had died under mysterious circumstances as a result of a 'drug overdose'. Mr. Bugg claims these allegations had been investigated at the time (1984), by 'high ranking officers,' in what obviously could well be described as a lethargic manner. 2 This conclusion is born out by the carefully chosen words of Mr. Richard Chugg when he made a statement to the press upon the announcement of his own and Insp Cameron's early retirement. Mr Chugg informed those present that he'd numbered among senior police ranks for ten years before he had been appointed Assistant Commissioner, and that he indeed had "ordered" the phone tapping to check the veracity of serious allegations against serving senior police, and that for him to have done otherwise, "…would have been a dereliction of duty." He also pointed out, that had a full and vigorous inquiry into some of the allegations he termed 'rumours' which 'underlaid' his giving of that order, had been carried out back in 1984, it was unlikely that he would have been placed in the unfortunate position in which he now found himself. It would appear Mr. Chugg is suggesting, that these same serious allegations were not of a recent origin. 3 Interestingly, the DPP chooses to also conceal the identity of those 'high ranking officers' who for reasons never divulged, failed to vigorously pursue the investigation and make full closure of the matter 10 years earlier. Of course, Richard McCreadie was a 'high ranking officer' in the Tasmania Police. Returning now to the two letters, that triggered the DPP's intervention. In them, a senior police officer identified "rumours and allegations" involving, illicit drug dealing, cultivation of marijuana, association with organised crime figures, and murder, which involved mainland states and even the Federal Police. As late as 19th of August 1994, Police Minster Dr. Frank Madill, was still insisting that 'the matter was in the hands of Police Commissioner John Johnson', but clearly this was not the case. The DPP had in fact instructed Johnson to put his inquiry on hold. Information was "leaking" to The Mercury, and it becomes clear Johnson's internal investigation was now publicly compromised in the scandal which the media had christened, the "phone tapping affair". In a possible attempt to maintain some credibility, Johnson was reported as stating in late July of 1994 that 'the inquiry was nearing completion'. Obviously the media was deliberately being played like a good violin in this scandal, and so the man in the street was totally confused. From the Bugg Report though, it quickly becomes apparent that the "telephone tapping affair" was solely a DPP inquiry, and also that telephone charge tracking was most definitely not the focus of the that inquiry at all. Had the tracking of telephone calls by certain police officers been the focus, some quite unpalatable facts would most probably have been exposed. In a later report and in response to questions, Assistant Commissioner Richard Chugg, "…revealed he had authorised checks on the telephone calls of Richard McCreadie…," who by then was Deputy Commissioner of Police. Referred to as "continuing differences", the contents of letters exchanged between Chugg and McCreadie were published by the media in September. It would be hard to deny, that Mr Chugg was being provoked. Did one party hope for an imprudent statement that could prove the other's undoing? 4 Here several points need to be made clear: A later news report explained that the wellspring of this 'telephone tapping affair' was the Tasmania Police Drug Bureau, and in particular, the policewoman Helen Margaret Cameron in that Bureau. But who was the mystery 'senior officer' that went to the Secretary of Dept. of Justice? Was it either of the investigating officers? This could hardly be the case, as they had only just commenced their investigation on an internal basis. So would it not more likely to have been one of the 'targets' of those original serious allegations? Remember the only name which appears in media reports as the police officer "implicated" in the inquiry to this stage, was none other than Richard McCreadie. The Bugg Report devotes almost all of its energies, such as they were, to investigating the role of two police officers implicated in the original case called the "Rhyndaston drug plantation investigation". As only two police, referred to by the DPP as "A" and "B" are the only police alleged to have been implicated in the 1982-1983 Rhyndaston drug investigation, and also, as Richard McCreadie was the Tasmania Police officer named and exonerated by the Bugg Inquiry, then it becomes very clear that while Supt. Cashion was the other officer whose phone call charges were the subject of tracking, he was not necessarily either officer "A" or "B". We know Richard McCreadie is either "A" and "B", but we can only speculate as to which of these two officers he is. The identity of the other officer is a mystery. So the sixty-four-thousand-dollar question still remains, was McCreadie "A" or "B"- but still who was the other officer? The Bugg Inquiry was theoretically overt and transparent: in truth, it was opaque and covert. The DPP deliberately chose to conceal from the public, the identity of officers "A" and "B". The DPP deliberately chose to name Richard McCreadie as one of the police officers under investigation, and that those same investigations had completely exonerated him. However, because Mr Damien Bugg just as deliberately chose to conceal the name of the other police officer, the public have been left to speculate as to his identity. This situation has left Supt Cashion in an ambiguous position. But additionally, it left the possibility of yet a further officer within the Tasmania Police Force that could be subjected to rumour and innuendo for ever and a day. If the officer was completely exonerated, why not name him? Parliament was not obligated to accept such an indefinite report. Police Minster Dr. Frank Madill figured prominently in the parliamentary debates on the subject, but ssurely the Premier should have demanded all officers investigated by the DPP be named and their status made public. So, who in the Government of the day had allowed the DPP to wind-up his inquiry, and leave it in such an unacceptable, unresolved mess? 5 Rhyndaston by the way, is a small rail-stop town on the Midland line, about 70km north of Hobart on today's route C313. It was near Rhyndaston in 1982 on a property then owned by Mr. Lionel Young, that allegedly a Mr. O'Toole transported a container of material to Young's property to cultivate a crop of marijuana. Others identified in the subsequent investigation, were Mr. Eddie Murtagh and a Mr Howie, both South Australians, along with Mr. Lombe, and a US citizen by the name of Richardson. While Lionel Young provided the soil, location and a caravan, in the scheme of things, he was a bit-player in Tasmania's illicit drug cartel. Obviously there could have been many such bit-players over the years. But those mentioned above are also only the mug foot soldiers: the "godfather" and his network surely still remains? 6 In 1982, police from the "well manned" local station new of "rumours" concerning the existence of a drug crop in the area. This information obviously would have filtered through to Drug Squad Detectives. Very late in December of 1982 this Squad raided the neighbouring property to Lionel Young and understandably found nothing of substance, except that they were able to charge some of the residence with 'minor drug related offences'. Interestingly, the circumstances surrounding this raid were (deliberately?) avoided by the DPP in his report. This first raid obviously would have alerted all involved with the Young enterprise. A week after the abortive raid on the neighbour and around January 1 of 1983, a local policeman paid Lionel Young a visit, and with the place deserted, he even had a wander around the caravan, before leaving. Later he phoned Mr. Young asking him, "if he knew of any drugs growing in the area". Surely this would have proven to have sounded the alarm bells for yet a second time. Not surprisingly you understand, when Drug Squad Detectives and a local Sergeant travelled to Lionel Young's property, "at about 3.00 a.m. on the 7th February" 1983, the place was deserted, although without too much trouble they located a 'well prepared' and tended plantation, "…containing a significant number of maturing indian [sic] hemp plants." 7 The protection of the informant "Mr. H," by Damien Bugg is really quite extraordinary. In the DPP's Report the heading reads, "The Statutory Declaration In Early April 1984": it was now 1994. So "Mr. H" had made this statement ten years earlier. But, here's the rub, Bugg attempts to make the case, that at the time the allegations (he downgrades to "rumours"), were circulating, "…it was a firmly held belief that the person who made these allegations was dead and unavailable as a witness." Now this position may be to the naïve almost believable, but ponder these facts. The DPP received two letters no later than 7 July 1994, and on the next day, Friday the 8th, he assembled, briefed his investigators, and launched his investigation, using information supplied by one source, the Senior Policeman who we have suggest must have been either Supt. Cashion or more than likely Deputy Comm. Richard McCreadie, both of whom were targets of the initial internal phone charge tracking inquiry. Bugg though, not only did with remarkable swiftness discover that "Mr. H" was alive and well, but he locates his whereabouts interstate, and on the Mainland, and his investigators are even able to visit him and conduct a video interview! The DPP was able to achieve all of this in the remarkable time of 15 working days! This surely indicates, the high ranking policeman who authored the two letters knew "Mr. H" was not only alive and well, but exactly where he resided - interstate. It surely is no wonder, that Damien Bugg states, 'I regard him [Mr. H] as a totally unreliable witness.' 8 But the questions that then begs an answer is these: If "Mr H" moved and residing interstate, on the Mainland is such an unreliable witness, what circumstances caused the high ranking police officers mentioned in his declaration, to keep "tabs" on him? After all, why should these high ranking police have harboured any concerns about defective allegations "Mr H" had made 10 years earlier, to be moved to keep tabs on his whereabouts interstate? However, we must also not forget that Mr Bugg claims in his report, that he interviewed both Policemen - A and B - and that they claimed they were unaware of some of these same allegations? It really seems quite improbable. The ease with which the DPP located this supposed deceased person, even residing interstate, is suggestive of much closer relationship to some of the parties involved in the 'phone tapping affair' than is explained by Mr Bugg's rather lame excuses. Apparently contained within "Mr. H's" statement, were allegations which included 36 claims against Mr McCreadie and another officer, "including murder, involvement in the drug trade, receipt of large amounts of money, and even allegation [that] a senior officer was linked to the disappearance of German backpacker Nancy Grunwaldt." This last allegation we shall examine shortly. Understandably, community concerns and impatience, were heightened when reports suggested Damien Bugg QC and Comm. John Johnson, were indicating the report, 'may not be tabled in the State Parliament' which amounted to nothing short of yet another cover-up. 9 An un-named source (possibly inside the Parliament), was reported to have called for changes to police internal-investigation procedures, due to the rather curious concerns that, "criminals were abusing the system to avoid apprehension". Perhaps some of the key people in this affair aren't familiar with this advice originating from the Scriptures: "Even a fool, if he holds his peace, is thought wise." Coincidentally of course, in that same report none other than Richard McCreadie - one of the targets in the phone taps - was quoted as responding, "if Criminals are complaining for these reasons, their complaints are not reaching my office," going on to explain that over the period of 1993-94, "…only three of the 180 complaints could be classified as coming from criminals." In light of the matters already raised in this article, a rather enlightening statement. But why would Tassie's criminals be complaining? 10 The chief investigator in the "phone tapping affair" was unquestionably the DPP, Mr Damien Bugg QC, while Comm. John Johnson authored a report that went to Cabinet, Mr Bugg instructed him to "lay off". Even Mr Chugg was instructed not to respond to questions from the media, but leaked information continued to appear which was certainly unfavourable to both Asst. Comm. Chugg and Supt. Cameron, the above being just one example. While Mr Chugg made it very clear, that 'he would fight the inquiry publicly and fully if charges were laid against him'. The opposition's David Llewellyn made calls for the report to 'be made public and in full immediately'. 11 On 23 September 1994, the media announced the retirement from Tasmania Police, of both Assist. Comm. Richard Chugg and Supt. Cameron of Burnie, the officers who admitted authorising the phone tracking. Comm. Johnson confirmed that his report was now complete and that he would not be making it public, as the, "…matters had been resolved to his satisfaction and no further action was called for," a decision almost surely not arrived at by him alone, as the DPP was after all the principal investigator. In light of, and considering all of the foregoing, perhaps the reader may not be too surprised to learn, after investigations were complete, "Mr Bugg found all the rumours to be unfounded." 12 Employing FOI legislation, we are able to confirm some of the details of that concealed report which make for interesting reading. Both Policemen who instigated the phone surveillance were compelled to resign. Both senior policemen retired with their full entitlements. In the minds of those in the prosecuting authority - the DPP - undoubtedly this result is what subsequently Comm. John Johnson referred to as being matters 'resolved satisfactorily'. Both of these senior Police officers were severely rebuked by Comm. John Johnson. However, the language used by himself and his chief investigator, Damien Bugg QC, may seem to the reader at least - quaint. But perhaps when considering the true climate within this "most outstanding team of people" in Tasmania Police, the term "accommodating" is surely closer to the mark? There was but one source of support for Comm. Johnson's censure, and so naturally he was obliged to quote that source in his report - to substantiate his reactions and solutions. That sponsor of course was the supposed independent investigator Damien Bugg QC, who's only criticism on record directed toward the actions of Mr. Chugg and Mr. Cameron, and highlighted in the brief 5 pages we obtained under FOI of the Johnson Report, are summed up by Mr Bugg in one word - "lamentable". 13 In the same report, Comm. Johnson explained that Assist. Comm. Chugg and Supt. Cameron were subject to his investigation for one reason only, that of the two officers, "failure to communicate". In the pages we accessed of John Johnson's report no suggestion is evidenced which suggest the pair were motivated by malice or criminal intent. In fact, among the pages available to us, only several instances appear where Comm. Johnson assesses their actions as, "totally unacceptable" and, "totally untenable". It becomes clear, Assist. Comm., Chugg and Supt. Cameron's only 'crime' in this whole drawn-out affair, was nothing more than a lack of procedural judgement on their part, and one must then ask the question: "Why were these matters not dealt with as an internal, procedural, disciplinary, matter?" It becomes painfully obvious the DPP's investigation of 'possible criminal activity' among high ranking police was turned back upon the two investigating policemen by the DPP's take-over only ever made possible by the two letters lodged upon his desk by a sympathetic Justice Department. The crime-fighters were transformed into target criminals. 14 The 'satisfactorily resolved' situation is a misnomer Taswegians still live with to this day: good honest Tasmania Police are compelled to operate in a climate of 'gag'. Do they ever now gain promotion without fear or favour? Simply, Mr Chugg and Mr Cameron did not inform their superior of their intended investigation. But why? Did they have reason to fear the "target" may somehow learn of the investigation? It would seem the phone tapping affair has born this out. Richard McCreadie was exonerated in all the matters by Damien Bugg QC. If that is an unequivocal position, would not the outcome have been the same, had Chugg and Cameron's investigation not been thwarted, but allowed to be concluded internally? Bibliography 1. passim, the Bugg Inquiry - 1994. 2. ibid. 3. Rae Walsh - The Mercury, 30sep94, p.7 4. Bugg Report - 1994; Sue Bailey & Rae Walsh - The Mercury, 20aug94, p.3; Lester Michael, "Charges ruled out on probes into police - The Mercury, 14sep94, p.7. 5. Ellen Winnett, The Mercury, 04jul97, pp.1-2. 6. ibid. 7. ibid, p.8 8. ibid, inf. 9. The Mercury, ibid, & Stuart Potter - The Mercury, 03sep94, p. 3; 10. Stuart Potter - The Mercury, 03sep94, p. 3. 11. Sue Bailey & Rae Walsh - The Mercury, 20aug94, p.3. 12. Rae Walsh, "Top cops quit" -The Mercury, 24sep94, p.1-2 13. FOI, Cabinet Papers, Tas. Gov. dated 4 April 1995. 14. ibid.
Chapter 3: SOME HATE THE "TRAITOR", BUT LOVE THE TREACHERY
"Wait time and place to act thy revenge, for it's never well done in a hurry". - so goes the old proverb.
We turn now to another incident that arose in 1997, inextricably tied to illicit drugs, telephone-call tracing, some Tasmania Police, the Justice Department, and the judiciary. We now shall examine the story of Policewoman Helen Margaret Cameron, mentioned above. You may remember Helen Cameron worked in the Tasmania Police Drug Bureau. In that position she was reported to have made serious allegations that, "a senior police officer was involved in drug activities". The information you may remember would have come from allegations made in the Statutory Declaration made by the mysterious "Mr. H". Miss Cameron's actions lead to her becoming recognised as the 'genesis' of what became known as the "phone tapping affair". But her story, has nought to do with telephones - but all to do with pay-back. 1 Some time after Mr Chugg and Supt. Cameron had retired, Helen Cameron (no relation to the Supt.) actually did receive promotion to Sergent. But through her legal counsel, claimed she felt isolated, under increasing strain and, "…regarded with disfavour by the police hierarchy". Because, rather than being promoted within the Drug Bureau, she was actually moved 'sideways' and transferred to the position of Sergent-in-charge at Latrobe, just south of Devonport in the State's central north. Helen Cameron's demise was triggered, by an incident which occurred after she attempted to 'escape' from a Christmas party she'd help organise for the Station. At the party, Cameron was said to have consumed, 'not quite four stubbies'. Cameron allegedly attempted to cover-up being the driver of a marked police car which was involved in a minor, single vehicle accident. She subsequently implicated three constables, Judges, Groves and Eastwood, in the cover-up attempt. The incident was exposed by an internal investigation, but importantly not contained within that investigation. We are unable to report though, who the investigating officers were. For what would seem to be matters that normally would have been dealt with as 'disciplinary', or at most misdemeanours and so heard before a magistrate's court, somehow they were resolutely amplified to that of a felony of, "perverting the course of justice", and listed to be heard before the Supreme Court. Also of significance, is the fact that on the 23 June, the hearing was rescheduled from her familiar town of Burnie, to Launceston to be heard on 30 June 1997. It was reported that this was necessitated after the presiding Judge took ill. 2 In defence of Helen Cameron's earlier raised allegations of senior police involvement in illicit drugs, which had lead to the Bugg Inquiry into the 'phone tapping affair', her lawyer Tim Ellis, was quoted as stating, "' Mr McCreadie, now Commissioner McCreadie, was implicated as the person involved.' " Of course earlier, the then Dept. Commissioner, Richard McCreadie was completely exonerated, you must remember. 3 But it is hard to deny the fact that like the two senior police who'd earlier instigated the 'phone tapping' investigation, Helen Cameron's amenable resignation and her plea of 'Guilty' undoubtedly did expedite the DPP's judgement of agreeing to a three-month suspended jail sentence for her. Cameron's knowledge as to any alleged organised drug network overseen by a 'godfather' figure of course now posed no further threat to such an operation, if indeed it ever existed, as not only was she now away from the Police Drug Bureau but she was literally - out of the force and later departed for warmer climes. From our enquiries, we can reveal Helen Cameron was so alarmed by the whole experience, she has settled on the mainland, just about as far way from Tasmania as is possible. But the reader can decide as to whether or not her mistrust of police hierarchy was well founded or not, by considering this outcome regarding the 3 constables involved: they were fined trivial amounts of between $200 and $280 each, and dropped a band in salary. But importantly, they must have been considered useful by senior police, and so they retained their spot in "the team", only transferred for a short period. But what for? After all, hadn't "the problem" - Helen Cameron - been removed? But consider the frank caution Tim Ellis was reported to have issued when he stated," 'The Director of Public Prosecutions was instrumental in obtaining that result … at a time when he didn't have a case [against Cameron] unless they [the constables,] gave evidence'. Continuing he said, "…those actions 'having been not only approved but instigated by the prosecuting authority', should raise questions. " - a reproach aimed directly toward Damien Bugg QC. No doubt, some one may have been even a little concerned that Mr Ellis could well revisit this contentious matter if the opportunity ever arose at some later time. 4 Few men can love a friend who's fortunes thrive; unless they feel the fortune themselves. You see, back in 1996, Ellis' learned friend Mr Bugg, along with the Solicitor General Bill Bale QC, received a substantial and coincidentally "timely" hike in pay: "Law chiefs' pay rockets" read Steven Dally's front page headline of The Mercury, 19 October, 1996. Dally's report announced that Damien Bugg received the annual salary of $107,638 and that this had 'rocketed' to $169,336 p.a. - or in excess of a staggering 57 percent salary increase! On top of this windfall, Damien Bugg was paid a further sum of $50,000 in back pay, plus $2,500-a-year expense allowance and a 'private-plated car'. This took the DPP's all-up income from the Justice Department in the calendar year of 1996, to around $221,836.oo. It would seem in Tasmania at least, the "crime industry" pays handsomely. We should point out that this 'pay-hike' came amid all the shenanigans and procession of defence lawyers that unfolded during the pre-trail period for Martin Bryant who was proving difficult to convince he should plead guilty. The Terry Hill affair was also still simmering, and after John Avery took the case, Martin Bryant was to change his plea to one of Guilty, and so a trail was averted and only a sentencing hearing necessary with Mr Bugg prosecuting. 5 Interestingly though, the Federal Justice Department, shortly made two rather deliberate appointments: Mr Tim Ellis, (remember Helen Cameron's lawyer who attacked the DPP), well, he was appointed the Tasmania DPP, surely renumerated to the tune of around $169,336 p.a., replacing Damien Bugg QC. With Mr Bugg appointed Federal DPP, a promotion, and undoubtedly another rise in salary, but as to the amount we unable to confirm. However, he didn't move to Canberra, choosing to stay among friends, and he works out of premises in the city of Hobart. How does that proverb go about 'paying the ferryman'? Bibliography 1. Ellen Winnett, "Guilty cop's lawyer tells," - The Mercury, Hobart, pp. 1-2. 2. ibid. 3. Ellen Winnett, 'In brief' - The Mercury, 24jun97, p.11. 4. Ellen Winnett, "Guilty cop's lawyer tells" - The Mercury, 4jul97, pp.1-2. 5. Steven Dally, "Law Chiefs' pay rockets" - The Mercury, 19oct96, p.1.
Chapter 4: LIES, DIGNITY, AND POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS
Returning now to examine - briefly - the police shooting of Joseph Gilewicz. To narrate this shooting death of the morning of 16 July 1991, requires some qualification. It is beyond the scope of this article to address all of the complexities and intrigues of this one event, but we trust there is enough detail here for you to consider, and thus draw a reasonably informed conclusion. In January 1992, Richard McCreadie received promotion to Deputy Commissioner. Magistrate Ian Matterson, began a Coronial Inquest 8 months later, on 19 March 1992, at which time First Class Const Stan Hanuszewicz appeared, to blow the whistle and allege a police cover-up. By April, the Labor Opposition was calling for an external and independent inquiry. May 29, saw Ian Matterson deliver a finding of justifiable homicide, but the identity of the police sniper who fired the fatal shot remained concealed. Before a Full Court in Hobart, in April of 1994 Const Michael Colin Fogarty was named as the mystery police sniper who shot Joe Gilewicz. In 1999, Greens MHA, Peg Putt after four attempts, still failed to table the documents relating to 'new evidence' in the Gilewicz shooting, but her actions forced the Premier Jim Bacon (ALP), to announce on November 24, 1999 the appointment of Stephen Estcourt QC, to conduct a review of new evidence as well as Paul Tapp's manuscript. Next day, Greens Senator Bob Brown attempted to table the Tapp documents in the Federal Parliament. The Mahoney Inquiry was established on February 25, 2000, and opened for hearings on May 8. Commissioner Dennis Mahoney handed his report to the Governor on October 11, and it was tabled in the Tasmanian Parliament on the 25 October 2000. When one considers carefully the words of the Commissioner in his detailed report, of interest is the little known fact, that Jim Bacon (ALP), current Tasmania Premier, came from across Bass Strait and Victoria. Jim Bacon was in the 1980's 2 IC to the notorious boss of the Builder's Labourers Federation (BLF), Norm Gallagher. It was this union that was the centre of ongoing disputes with successive governments and employer organisations which lead to lock-outs, strikes and demarcation disputes, especially in its power bass Melbourne. There were accusations of graft and corruption within its executive ranks. It was a period of great union disquiet in the building industry, which escalated significantly from early in the term of the Cain Government. In April of 1982, John Cain (jnr) had won office in Victoria, and as is often the case, his Labor government turned against the BLF, which culminated in a raid on their offices, confiscation of records followed by an inquiry which saw the union bosses heavily fined and the union deregistered. 1 It can be said that the esprit de corps had negligible influence upon the eventual outcome concerning the death of Joe Gilewicz, but arguably it was a part of that indeterminate force that brought together those with ties to the corp, which drove the cause forward toward a Royal Commission to expose evidence denied the earlier Coronial Inquiry before Mr. Matterson. Formerly a journalist with ABC, Paul Tapp retired while working in Adelaide, returning to Tasmania where he was to reside at Orford. Born in 1945, Paul Tapp had served two tours in Vietnam in 1967, his last with 7-RAR, the same battalion in which Joe Gilewicz served. At the conclusion of an Anzac Day march - either in 1995 or 1996 - he approached retired policeman Stan Hanuszewicz who agreed to cooperate with Tapp in a project, to write a story on two families: the Gilewicz and Hanuszewicz families. Stanislaus Hanuszewicz was born in 1945, and served twelve years with the Australian Defence Force. In Vietnam, he did his first 12 months tour with the infantry as part of 1-RAR, transferring to the Armoured Regiments where he served in 1-ARMD Regt transferring to 3-CAV Regt staying with this regiment for about a further 5 years; a not inconsequential term of national service. Both families had immigrated to Australia and then Tasmania. They had the same ethnic origins, both had sons who served in the Armed forces in Vietnam, one became a policeman, the other a fisherman who was shot and killed by the policeman's colleagues: his death investigated by ballistics policeman, Stan Hanuszewicz. First Class Const Hanuszewicz had joined the Tasmania Police fresh from Vietnam, around 1972. About four years later in 1976, he joined the Scientific Bureau, notching up sixteen years of experience in ballistics. Within months of Stan's collaboration, Paul Tapp saw his project focusing increasingly on the shooting itself, obviously as a result from what he was hearing. Before Coroner Ian Matterson, delivered his findings in 1992, there was a call for an open inquiry, and the Commission later heard that Stan Hanuszewicz had, "from shortly after the incident, expressed concerns…" to Supt Philpott, "…about the inquiry," which Philpott in turn raised with Supt. Chugg. Even Richard McCreadie admitted he was well aware of Stan Hanuszewicz's concerns and problems he had expressed to his superiors, regarding several areas of his investigation. Richard McCreadie further stated that he had his colleague Mr Roffe, intercept a summons for Stan to appear before the Coroner, as in his words, "Mr Roffe … knew of my interest in this matter", and we shall return to the segment later. By the time of the Royal Commission, Mr Philpott was retired and then living on the Mainland. 2 On November 24, 1999, Premier Jim Bacon announced the appointment of Stephen Peter Estcourt QC, to make preliminary inquiries as to the seriousness of new allegation Paul Tapp's manuscript raised and for him to report his advice as to the need for a Royal Commission. Subsequently the Hon Dennis Mahoney AO QC was appointed Commissioner and his inquiry commenced public hearings on the 8th of May, 2000. Even before 1991, a systemic culture of power and nepotism in high places had attached itself like a parasite does to a host- in this case the host was the people of the communities of Tasmania. Upon this "host" the "parasite" continues to wreak immeasurable treachery right to this day. It was subject to this "culture", that the terms of reference were laid down, under "statutory amendments" enacted significantly, in 1995.* coincidentally of course - just in time for those defining events of 1996, which emasculated the ability of the Commission of Inquiry to such an extent it caused the Commissioner Mahoney to report: "…one group of powers which was not made available to the investigators … the powers of ordinary Constables of the Police Service and the power to make use …of forms of listening devices. …[In] particular the power to use listening devices, are of particular importance in an investigation of members of organised groups, such as a Police Service." (*see end note) He went further by reporting much correspondence on the subject, concluding that this constraint :- "..significantly hindered the investigators and hindered the investigations which I desired to carry out. …other possible lines of investigation had necessarily to be put aside." Had Mr Mahoney been able to deploy the powers denied him, in the Commissioner's own estimation, the outcome could well have been quite different. This admission was deliberately put on the record by an obviously honest and frustrated Commissioner, emasculated by the systemic culture manifest in Tasmania. 3 Joe Gilewicz was 43-years-of-age when he died instantly from a sniper's bullet fired by Const. Michael Fogarty of Tasmania Police; "Sierra 4" to his SOG colleagues on this operation, and their "senior sniper". This account was never under challenge from any of the parties. Gilewicz, Joseph - No. 6709497, and aged 22-years, had volunteered to serve his country, as an infantryman in 7-R.A.R., in 1970. He did a tour of 11 months straight in Vietnam until 14 January 1971, at the dirty end of the Vietnam War. One of Joe Gilewicz's battalion officers testified that Joe, "had the most dangerous, demanding job that any individual in Vietnam could have…a forward scout, the point man in a section". In Joe, his mates put their complete trust. Joe survived the booby-traps, landmines, ambushes, and bullets of a determined enemy in South Vietnam, but he was unable to survive the peace - Tasmania style. Like so many of our servicemen, he found it difficult to pick up the threads of a normal lifestyle, when along with his mates they walked out into a markedly changed and in many ways hostile society after they were discharged. 4 Like so many veterans, the Vietnam legacy caused Joe Gilewicz, his family and loved ones to suffer for 20 years, him especially with severe physical pain and mental anguish of PTSD. The extended family suffered also from the radiating effects of PTSD. In civilian life Joe Gilewicz was no 'angel'. During the Coronial Inquest in 1992, and the Mahoney Inquiry, evidence of alleged amphetamine abuse, and links with a domestic marijuana drug trade were raised, but understandably never pursued. By July of 1991, his quality of life was severely diminished, and he described himself as, moody irritable, his life ruined, his family life poor with little or no enjoyment. By the 1990's, Joe Gilewicz resided in a modest timber dwelling in steep country of Tasmania's tranquil bush on Hall's Track Road, near Pelverata, about 33km South West of Hobart. His wife Christine had chosen to separate from him - all symptomatic of severe PTSD. In fact Mr. Gregory Sward testified that Joe had falsely accused him of having an affair with Joe's wife, in the week before his death. On Saturday morning, 13th July, Greg Sward states he went to Pelverata to sort it out, and that Joe fired two shots at him, a struggle ensued for the gun, with him punching Joe, taking the rifle and he leaving. But, surely had not Joe earned some "space" some consideration, some professional help? Also Joe was for a long time a very "restless" man, a behaviour that in 1991, obviously SOG officers could not cope with. Even John Winston Howard stated publicly, of such veterans, the Commonwealth is obligated to "…care for them if they are hurt, to generously support them and to make certain their loved ones are cared for and looked after." Hollow promises from the man who ensures he's there on national TV, waving good-bye to Defence Force personnel, and deliver such moving words to welcome them home again - but ever so far away from where the bullets fly… 5 Although Australia's Vietnam adventure concluded in 1973, as late as 1987, 'few health professionals, and fewer lawyers understood PTSD.' A rather strange state of affairs, when one realises as early as 1921 in England, the effects of traumatic stress on veterans out of the trenches and dug-outs of France was already being researched and documented by John Rawlings-Reese M.D. Although, as late as 1980 the American Psychiatric Association's record, the DSM, had still not grouped PTSD symptoms under one heading, and as was demonstrated in the Mahoney Inquiry by Dr Bell's testimony, the situation persists where subliminal interests still produce contentious disagreement between mental health professionals. 6 Here Police Sergeant Graham Galloway, enters our story. As Mr Mahoney rightly pointed out, "There is a report by Dr David Bell in evidence which seeks to explain Mr Galloway's behaviour and evidence, by reference to an inability to handle stress. However, no Counsel examined Dr Bell on this report, and no evidence was given by Mr Galloway to confirm the history which Mr Galloway gave to Dr Bell." You may remember above it was noted that Stan Hanuszewicz had no counsel appearing for him, so he was unable to cross examine Dr Bell, regarding Bell's reasoning for Graham Galloway's change in evidence, and likewise repudiate Dr Bell's imperious opinion which rejected out of hand the three independent assessments that Stan Hanuszewicz did indeed suffer with PTSD. This situation added to the distorted conclusions of the Inquiry to a considerable degree. There was never any doubt or conflict as to how Joe Gilewicz died by any of the parties: the controversy was sparked by the circumstances surrounding his death and the subsequent investigation. Even after the 1992 Coronial Inquest, there was never any argument from any of the parties: Joe Gilewicz died as a result of one 130 grain hollow-point bullet, from a 7.62x51mm, (.308W) Winchester round, deliberately aimed and fired from a PSG1 sniper rifle in the hands of SOG officer, "Sierra 4" (Const. Michael Fogarty) on the morning of 16 July 1991. 7 From as early as the late 1980's in Tasmania, the Fogarty's could well be called a police dynasty. Surely four policemen from one family in the Tasmania Police at any one time could well be described as unusual. Superintendent Colin H. Fogarty was the family patriarch. Then there is Det. Sergt. Mark A. Fogarty and Sergt Andrew M. Fogarty. Lastly there is Const Michael C Fogarty. They all played significant rolls in the police operations at Pelverata on 15-16 July and all appeared before the Inquiry. Significant also is the fact that during the Mahoney Inquiry of 2000, David Gunson appeared for Const. Michael C Fogarty, and his SOG "second", Sergt Nigel L. Paul. Also worthy of mention is the fact, legal council for Supt. Colin Fogarty, Mr Brian Morgan, presented to the Commission a Statutory Declaration on Day 40, sworn by Kevin A. Rogers, himself a witness who appeared before the Commission, the content of which promoted the 'valued past service' to the nation's security by Mr. Colin Fogarty. Although the nature of Mr Fogarty's "service" was not explained, interestingly Kevin Rogers - not a policeman, nor a lawyer - was the former head of the Protective Security Co-ordination Centre - the PSCC - based in the Commonwealth's Attorney General's Dept., Canberra. This is the organisation that co-ordinates the training of all the State's SOG groups in Australasia. The reader can surely speculate as to the full effect of this revelation upon Mr. Mahoney, his Council assisting and not to any lesser degree upon all the Counsels 'appearing for', not to mention their clients. 8 Standing orders for the Pelverata operation were issued by assault team commander, Officer Dyson which were as follows: "Call on the suspect to police: don't move if unarmed. If armed and aggressive shorten to: drop your weapon. If you can retreat without challenge then do so." These were the base orders. Note the order " drop your weapon or we will shoot", did not appear in those standing orders. 9 Many pages of the Mahoney Inquiry is dedicated as to the circumstances under which Gilewicz was shot. While central to the very core of the event, after considering the voluminous transcript and report, it is difficult not to realize that this segment, was used by those before the Commission who were either former or current employees of the State and their Counsels, excepting Stan Hanuszewicz, to distract Mr. Mahoney from a weightier task. In his summing-up, at 4423, Mr Agius states, "It is unfortunate that despite the very large number of logs that were being maintained on this night, even when puts [sic] all of the logs together, one still does not get a complete picture of what was happening". You surely must find it extraordinary that nowhere in the 'large number of logs' police had running is there a mention of the actual shooting of Joe Gilewicz! Here we shall offer the following brief response to this important segment, that inevitably is the kernel of what became the 'Gilewicz affair'. Evidence was presented by Col. Andrew Ivan Julian Mattay, who served with the same battalion as Joe Gilewicz in Vietnam. In that evidence he took credit for drafting, "the now accepted quad-apartheid forum, America, Britain, Canada, Australia - for [police] snipers … the national anti-terrorist plan and under the auspices of SACPAV". Enthusiastically he made quite a few claims, that cover quite a deal of subject matter, but like this "accepted" plan, it does fall short when other documented evidence is considered. 10 So what protocols governed police in Australia in the use of 'lethal force' in July of 1991? The Australasian Police Minister's Conference (APMC) - which includes New Zealand - who gathered on 31 May, 1991 in Canberra, adopted a National Committee on Violence (NCV) recommendation concerning police use of lethal force, and unanimously agreed to adopted them in an 'out of session basis', which were laid down in a further NCV report contained within Chapter 23 under Recommendations 86.1, which in part reads:- "The use of force and firearms by law enforcement personnel should be proportionate to the legitimate objectives to be achieved, and commensurate with due respect for human rights." This code of behaviour originated directly from out of the United Nation 8th Congress in Havana Cuba, in 1990: there is no mention of Col Mattay in its drafting. Consider further that which directly impacts upon Australian Police and their use of lethal force, which in part, read as follows: USE OF LETHAL FORCE 1. police officers will not use firearms against another person except in self defence or defence of others against imminent threat of death or injury. So far so good, and further in part: 2. (b) Give a clear warning of their intent to use firearms; 3. When the use of lethal force is necessary, police will; (a) exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved; … (c) ensure that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or affected persons at the earliest possible opportunity. 11 From testimony, we learn that at about 7.20 am, Gilewicz informed the police negotiator of his intention to exit the dwelling, and go for his 'morning shot' on his own private land. He exited the dwelling, returning shortly to the porch at the front door and there his actions indicated to police, that he'd spotted the SOG sniper, Michael Fogarty and his second Sergt Nigel Paul, located about 60m (65.6 yds.) away. It was alleged he pointed his Boito 12 ga side-by-side shotgun towards their position. It is further claimed Snr Const Nigel Paul twice called on Joe Gilewicz to, 'put down the weapon', and that he then witnessed a muzzle flash, and in that instance SOG Const Michael Fogarty shot Joe Gilewicz dead. The following facts are deserving of your consideration here: said twice, the command 'put down the weapon' takes approximately 2.33 seconds, that is not 'an instance'. Further, when the protocols above are considered, the reader will note that the important instruction at "2. (b)" is clearly missing from Sergt Nigel Paul's warning. Why? Is it not fair to say, that like the denial of necessary powers by Government to the Mahoney Commission of Inquiry, perhaps, the denial of this information may have also had a profound effect upon Mr. Mahoney's conclusions regarding that important segment of the incident. 12 Mr Galloway, already mentioned as one of the significant witnesses, will reappear in another matter shortly, as the self-professed expert, forensic and ballistic policeman, stationed at St Helens. At St Helens in 1995 and directly because of his incompetence and failure to carry out the fundamental investigatory practice of taking notes, saw him removed from the Cafasso murder inquiry on its second day. But during preliminary inquiries into the Gilewicz shooting, Paul Tapp informed Mr. Estcourt that in September 1999 Sergt Graham Galloway, had told him, Michael C. Dyson the SOG assault team commander that day, had placed an empty 12 ga cartridge into the breach of Mr Gilewicz's double barrel shot gun after he lay deceased beside the porch. During the Mahoney Inquiry though, Galloway denied he'd ever made such a claim, even although in the same session he admitted lying to Mr. Dyson, about the substance of a conversation about the same incident with Stan Hanuszewicz. This was in spite of the fact that counsel assisting, Mr. Agius, had Graham Galloway admit that he was, "…sitting in that witness box in fear for the lives of your family and in fear that your house might be burnt down. Is that what you are saying?"-"Yes". But Galloway answered in the negative when Mr. Agius later suggested, "And that fear, I suggest to you, is strong enough for you to withhold from this Commission the truth about what it was that Mr. Dyson said to you and what it was that you said to Mr. Tapp?" What was the source of those threats? Surely Mr Galloway would not be suggesting they came from the Gilewicz family? Surely they didn't come from Stan Hanuszewicz or Paul Tapp? Surely not from any "public" person? The source of the threats seem so undeniably obvious! 13 Galloway testified while he understood completely that as a result of the information conveyed to Mr Estcourt QC by Paul Tapp, concerning their conversation, that a Royal Commission would almost surely ensue. Yet he expected the Commission of Inquiry to accept that he made no attempt whatsoever to approach, Tapp, Estcourt, McCreadie or anyone else with the purpose of setting the record straight. So frustrated was Mr Aguis, Council Assisting, that he was moved to ask: "Is that the action of a responsible sergeant of police in January of 2000?"- "That is the action of this particular sergeant of police, yes," responds expert Graham Galloway, to which Mr. Agius explodes, "That is a pack of lies." 14 Galloway's unconvincing, changed and illogical evidence stood. Indisputably, his about-face, imprecise recollections, amnesic mindset, and indirect responses on days 5 and 6 of the Mahoney Inquiry, had a disastrous effect upon its outcome, and the reader should not find it difficult to realize what had occurred here before the Commission of Inquiry. Those witnesses who contributed to Paul Tapp's manuscript, like its author, attracted much reproachful criticism from the outset: Stan Hanuszewicz was labelled as "one of the main protagonists" by Mr Dyson through the media, and he reiterated Mr. Matterson's "impression" as stated at the Inquest that of First Class Constable Hanuszewicz, "was a person basking in the glory of his immediate notoriety". When all the circumstances are examined which surround the affair, surely the reader would agree, they were rather wayward opinions. For in spite of his poor health, and for no personal gain what-so-ever, Stan Hanuszewicz willingly submitted to no less than 14 sessions - and of those, six were consecutive full days straight - facing vigorous cross examination from the various lawyers, and at risk of quite severe consequences, and all presented without a legal council appearing for him. Mr Michael Brett, appeared for Mr. Galloway. In February 2001, or ten years after Joe Gilewicz was shot dead by police, an incident occurred which in many instances, emulated that sad affair. Near Tumut in NSW, 90 State Protection Group (SPG) Police were flown-in from up to 400 km away to besiege the humble abode of a 57-year-old bushie, James "Hank" Hallinan. The Region Commander Eric Gollan oversaw this unwarranted force assembled to besiege Hank for 33 hours, in his bush hut and caravan where he had lived quietly for eight years. At one stage SPG pyrotechnics igniting a bushfire that threatened the district. But before the light had begun to fade, and on the afternoon of February 24, 2001, clutching his .22 pee-rifle, and drenched in tear-gas powder, Jimmy Hallinan was deliberately shot in the neck and killed, on the second attempt, while he stood, shaking with fear inside his simple home, among the gum trees in the countryside of Adjungbilly - near Kiley's run of Banjo Patterson fame. This callous shooting so angered the district's entire community, to protect the State's "sacred cow" and escape the local fury, authorities moved the inquest 178km away, to Temora in March 2002. Hank's family were then forced to travel, daily, for eight weeks, the two and a half hour journey morning and night. In this instance, retired court judge, Jim Staples was quoted as saying, "no order was given to drop the gun (a 22 bolt-action rifle)". Instead an SPG sniper was simply ordered to, "shoot the offender". Jim Staples was further reported as stating that the Hallinan Inquest was a farce, "I have no doubt Mr Hallinan was killed in a manner that constitutes an indictable offence", he said. At Pelverata, and witnessed by the police SOG's Renshaw, Johnstone, Caulfield and Dyson, Sgt. Nigel Paul ordered Gilewicz twice, to 'drop the weapon' - but the required "drill" - "or we will shoot" does not appear in the Gilewicz Inquiry transcript: like Hank, Joe was shot dead. 15 The Hallinan coronial inquest for NSW was, "…only the third to be held before a jury, and heard evidence from 74 witnesses". But acting on instructions from the bench, as could only be expected, the jury found the police marksman acted in accordance with "the execution of his duty". That was an irresponsible decision: Hank Hallinan's death had all to do with the police 6pm deadline, and little to do with the two shots discharged allegedly toward police, so Hank died at 6.03pm. Like Joe Gilewicz, Hank did not die as a result of sticking his finger in an electric jug! Both were shot dead quite deliberately, each by a trained marksman of the State. This outcome flies in the face of the popularly held myth that the State's ultimate morality is directed towards preservation of life and for the safety of all its citizens. Joe Gilewicz, the people at Seascape, and James Hallinan all attest to that notion being a deception. In the case of James Hallinan, we are expected to believe it all came about because, 'he spoke impolitely to a policeman in the main street of Tumut'? - What baloney! 16 So what parallels can be drawn between police actions at Pelverata, Adjungbilly, and Seascape? At Port Arthur, 32 people had already been shot dead by a gunman. He was observed to retreat into Seascape. Two sober requests from uniformed police at the scene for permission to use lethal force against the gunman were flatly denied by the senior officer, who must have been Sergeant Andrew M. Fogarty, then an SOG team leader, who inexplicably had already arrived from Hobart and was in close proximity. Permission was twice denied, as "this must happen," even although the blonde headed gunman was pursuing the naked, screaming, hostage Sally Martin, about the yard of her home! Was it Sally Martin? If not Sally Martin, then who? When questions were raised by the media, Richard McCreadie defended what he represented as police protocols of long standing when he stated: "From time to time the question's been raised, well, why didn't police shoot Bryant? Well its not our role, ah, to simply, shoot. There are very strict rules of engagement." But, if shot dead, would the gunman at Seascape proved embarrassingly someone other than Martin Bryant? At the time of Pelverata Richard McCreadie was Inspector-in-charge of the SOG's, while Inspector Thomas Priest was in charge of that deployment; Michael Charles Dyson was 'assault team commander' and 2IC of that deployment. 17 McCreadie's position was amplified by Assist. Comm. Luppo Prins, who was reported in The Mercury at the time explaining, "Seriously speaking, we only shoot if our life is in immediate danger …the rules of engagement are clear, and we maintained that throughout the event. We don't assassinate people. That's not what we're about. We cannot be judge, jury and executioner. We are accountable for our actions the same as everybody else, and if he had been shot by a police sniper there would have been a coronial inquiry and we would have had to satisfy the coroner it was justifiable." Not quite correct Mr. Prins! Members of the constabulary are drawn from the public, obliged by solemn oath, to protect their community's people, not just their own life or that of their - mates! However these three events confirm a different reality. Police it is clear are not accountable for their actions, "the same as everybody else", and at Port Arthur especially so! They deliberately denied Sally Martin a chance to live because, "this must happen"- and as well, it took police 6 hours to secure the Historic Site and offer anything approaching appropriate protection to the hundreds of traumatised people held there. Why also was an entire nation's people denied the coronial inquiry required by law, and referred to above by Mr Prins? Returning to the Gilewicz killing, it is clear this incident remained of such a threat to the status quo in Tasmania, that no less than nine legal counsels exercised leave to appear for nine of the Police called to account. Of significance is the fact that Richard McCreadie had two legal counsels: Mr Greg Melick, was Counsel representing Commissioner of Police Mr Richard McCreadie in his professional capacity, while Sir Max Bingham QC*, was Counsel representing Mr Richard McCreadie in his personal capacity. It is pertinent to ask as just an 'Inspector-in-charge of the SOG's' would Richard McCreadie have secured the services of two legal counsels? Remember, this is the State system of justice, that ensured the estate of Martin Bryant was frozen (later to be confiscated) before the trial date was set, which denied intellectually impaired Martin Bryant to defend the charges against him with a real lawyer prepared to "defend" by having his accusers justify their accusation! This situations highlights the unique Tasmanian system of - "family planning": you surely remember the author, Mike Bingham of "Suddenly One Sunday"? He puts his day to day journalistic skills to work with Hobart's newspaper, The Mercury, and then there's Richard Bingham, Secretary Dept. of Justice and Industrial Relations, who's name is associated with so many replies emanating from out of the Tasmania Government regarding queries into anything to do with the Port Arthur Massacre. But Sir Max Bingham, QC, has certainly circulated well in public life. He was a former Tasmanian police minister, attorney general, Opposition leader, member of the NCA and head of Queensland's Criminal Justice Commission for instance. During the hearing's early days the Commission investigators were tipped-off that Richard McCreadie was about to fly-out to Thailand with a male friend, and he was compelled to postpone his trip so as to appear on day 39, or six days before it concluded. But McCreadie was in safe hands. For after just 3 sitting days, and even before "the antagonist" Stan Hanuszewicz had made his first of 13 appearances, Sir Max stated, "I am now quite confident as one can be that there is no real expectation of any allegation against my client in his personal capacity that might render necessary my continued appearance here." Day 39 of the transcript does make interesting reading, and McCreadie's testimony was not lost on the Commissioner either. 18 (*Father to Richard Bingham, Sec. Dept. Justice & Ind. Rel.) Mr Mahoney noted that Stan Hanuszewicz ,"did not find at the scene what he would have expected to have found if Mr Gilewicz had been shot there as was suggested." When Hanuszewicz arrived at the scene on that freezing cold July morning, as an investigating officer of the Scientific Section, 'it was proper' that he should have examined the matter critically as he did. All police at the scene when the shooting occurred, new full well the ethos that prevailed on such incidents. "Yet at least initially while [Mr Hanuszewicz] was there, the proper procedures were not followed. In several respects, what was done did not conform with best or even good [police] practice. At least, that is the conclusion to which he came." Former Insp. Prestedge (earlier officer-in-charge of the Scientific Section), and Supt Chugg both made submissions in which they were very critical of what was done and how it appeared in relation to the investigation. As the buck stops with the OIC, the reader can deduce where the problems lay. Yet when considered in its entirety, the Mahoney Inquiry exposes that while Stan Hanuszewicz could well have been more astute at the outset of the investigation, he nevertheless did become entangled in a web of deceit, which only worsened during the coronial inquiry during which he was forced to suffer the unwarranted accusation from Ian Matterson of him supposedly, "basking in the glory of his immediate notoriety" . As we have pointed out in the Phone Tapping affair, outbursts in times of crisis often expose the true agendas of the powerful. 19 Well before the royal commission was established, Michael Dyson, "ex-Alpha 1" and the assault team's commander, chose to quote Mr. Matterson's unwarranted remarks, calculated to deride his former colleague Stan Hanuszewicz, and he described the work of Paul Tapp as "pure nonsense". However, the reality was the community at large felt aggrieved and suspicious of their police, and the situation for the two even more precarious. For retired policeman Stan Hanuszewicz, remorseful of fabricating his evidence he'd attempted to deal with at the Coronial Inquest, now he desperately wanted to extricate himself from its net. He steadfastly testified that he's yielded to peer-pressure only to find himself overwhelmed by circumstances that escalated in magnitude to such an extent that he feared for his life. Even when he appeared before the Magistrate, and admitted his part in the cover-up all he received for his trouble was distrust and ridicule. Eventually though, the systemic power which manifest itself within government, and deployed by them it effectively thwarted all of their efforts to expose the truth in the long run…20 Now to explain a crafty legal manoeuvre that almost backfired. Witness Dr Bell came from Sydney, and was approached by Mr. Melick, Counsel Appearing for Richard McCreadie - "in his professional capacity"- for Dr Bell to put forward several hypotheses in the form of reports concerning two key witnesses: Stan Hanuszewicz and Graham Galloway…but at the same time as a "bonus" - so to speak - and by their content, it was a less than a veiled attempt to discredit two 'key witnesses', and vindicate a third. Target of the "bonus" mentioned above, was the discrediting of the professional opinions of Dr Paddy Burges Watson, who coincidentally was Stan Hanuszewicz's treating Doctor. But to the other witness Graham Galloway, his "report" aimed to present justification for Galloway's change of evidence. Three with one blow!? 21 Dr Bell explained he was at the time, "editor of the Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences," and had an earlier lengthy association with the UN's World Health Organisation. Dennis Mahoney explained on the record about his close, long-time, personal friendship with David Bell, and reiterated that that friendship should not be seen as a factor that would influence in any way his finding in regard to Dr Bell's reports. A fact he assured the Court had in times past seen him find against Bell's opinions. He even challenged Mr. Melick's intentions in calling the witness, when he asked, "What is the significance of the report in relation to Galloway?", as there was no suggestion of mental health problems in Galloway's case. This did not dissuade Mr. Melick having Dr Bell deliver quite contentious opinions that were meant to explain away the actions of Graham Galloway in changing his evidence. Dr Bell in essence also offered his opinion, that Stan Hanuszewicz's recollections of himself planting the shot and having gone to the rifle range were made as a result of 'falsely recovered recollections'. Dr Bell also disputed the diagnoses of all three mental health professionals - including Emeritus Professor Ivor Jones, and Dr Paddy Burges-Watson, who'd diagnosed Stan Hanuszewicz as suffering from PTSD, even although Bell had never even spoken with Stan. 22 In another twist in this story, 68-year-old Dr Paddy Burges-Watson's appearance before the Commission was delayed, when on the night of Thursday 15 June, 2000, while driving south on the Midland Highway, he received multiple injuries in a two-vehicle collision. The other vehicle, a truck driven by an unidentified 55-year-old Campbell Town woman, was spun 180 degrees, and rolled onto its side, with the force of the impact. We still are not aware of the woman's identity. A really quite strange event, that coincidentally almost cost the life of one of the prime witnesses in the case who's evidence piled doubt upon police accounts of an important segment of the killing of Joe Gilewicz. While Paddy was admitted to the intensive care unit of Launceston General Hospital in a critical condition, of the woman's injuries - if any - no mention was made. The hearing continued, but it was ten weeks until Paddy was recovered enough to appear before the Inquiry on August 28 - day 41. Before he took the stand, there is on record a long discourse, instigated also by Mr. Melick, regarding whether or not a "section 18 notice" should have been served on Dr Burges-Watson. The manner of approach without notice, clearly displeased Commissioner Mahoney, and considerably irritated Counsel Assisting, Mr. Aguis, who described Mr Melick's tactic as a "curious application". This is a segment of this Commission of Inquiry that reveals much by associations, intrigues and legal manoeuvres, which in this instance failed to subvert entirely the Commissioner. 23 Upon examining Dr Burges-Watson's statement, it soon becomes apparent that via his two Counsels Mr McCreadie was very aware it contained explosive revelations. Hence to foregoing tactics. In the first instance the Doctor's testimony was in conflict with the Police account of the time of death of Joseph Gilewicz. This fact also had significant influence upon SOG Nigel Paul's claim of having sighted a "muzzle-flash" - possibly only of course in very poor light. Paddy Purges-Watson had received a phone request between 7.10 - 7.20am on the 16th, to come to the Major Incident Room (MIR) at Police Headquarters, Hobart. Without delay, he drove straight there, entering the MIR at about 7.45am. He testified that the situation in there impacted upon him "very heavily", because it was evident there was inexplicably a "total inactivity". The strange calm was shortly clarified when, "somebody said that somebody had been killed and they were waiting to hear who it was". That "somebody" was Joe Gilewicz, and as a consequence, the Doctor's evidence puts the time of death at - between 7.45am and 8.00am, a time which is very much in conflict with the finding by Mr Matterson, and Police statements. 24 The second instance that bears consideration, involves Dr Paddy Burges-Watson, and his patient, First Class Const Stan Hanuszewicz who stayed in his position in Tasmania Police Scientific Bureau until the end of February, 1992. In recounting this little segment, please recall the DPP's mission to interview "Mr H" in the 'phone tapping affair'… It seems that Supt Colin Fogarty before February 1992, had been charged with overseeing "police officers under rehabilitation," which of course included First Class Const Stan Hanuszewicz. It was about the end of February or early March, that Dr Paddy Burgess-Watson noted in his records, that "Hanuszewicz was very frightened," so much so in fact, that, "…the Legal Aid executive, the late Colin Brown had sent Mr Hanuszewicz to a safe place", on the Mainland for his own safety. Somewhere about the last week of March, Dr Burges-Watson received a phone call from Supt Colin Fogarty, in which Fogarty expressed his concerns should the Doctor judge Stan as 'fit to give evidence' at the forthcoming Gilewicz Inquest, and as he surely would be cross examined by Legal Counsel for both parties then, "there would be divided loyalties", but that if Paddy was prepared to deem Hanuszewicz as 'unfit for work', then "there would be no more trouble and he would call off the dogs". Dr Burges Watson continued by stating, "I believe that he meant that he would call off the officers who were trying to find Hanuszewicz on the Mainland". In summing-up by Counsel Assisting, Mr Agius suggested the Commission had to accept that the Doctor's version of events was clearly established and indeed did occur. This then begs the question: What was it that Supt Colin Fogarty's higher ranking officers so feared that they were able to justify the time and expense of having already deployed 'police officers' - plural - on the Mainland, searching for one of their colleagues who while on sick-leave, was going about his lawful business? After all, if Stan Hanuszewicz did give evidence at the Gilewicz Inquest, which his colleagues believed to be defective or untrue, then what did they have to fear when the Coroner would get to the bottom of it? Stan was the odd-man-out after all. But then surely it is entirely implausible for anyone to suggest that serious, believable threat against Stan's well-being that caused him to flee, should have originated from the Gilewicz family? Remember, it was none other than Richard McCreadie who told the Commission he was the senior officer who had "directed" Supt Roffe to initiate and "take what ever steps were necessary to find Hanuszewicz". Also, remember at the same time, McCreadie proudly boasted that he held a Summons for Stan to appear before the Coronial Inquest, he described as being, "…the vehicle that [he] sought to use," to bring that appearance about. 25 In his Report, Commissioner Mahoney expressed reservations as to the credibility of some police who appeared before him. Here he was not directing his suspicions toward First Class Const Stan Hanuszewicz. Richard McCreadie claimed he had "reasons" for withholding information from Coroner Matterson. But Commissioner Mahoney stated bluntly, "the reasons did not justify the failure of Mr McCreadie and other senior officers not to pass on the information," to the Coroner. Nonetheless, it seems incredulous that even with this unacceptable state of affairs established, Commissioner Mahoney chose not to issue any recommendations for a ministerial reprimand, let alone a prosecution by the DPP. But at least now the reader has a window into the character and mindset of the SOG officers and some senior police in that "outstanding team of people", Comm. Richard McCreadie is eternally proud of. Lets take a look at some of the "team" players: When Mr Dyson arrived at the scene from his mobile command post, and not having witnessed the shooting, he stated that Gilewicz lay 'crouched' beside the porch decking of the entrance to his dwelling. The 'senior sniper' Sierra 4, had shortly before fired a deliberate, single shot that had killed him. Backed by his colleagues in their black bullet-proof-vests and with Colt AR15's at the ready, Dyson testified that he approached the body, placed his weapon on the ground to his rear, and bent down to the victim: "I felt for a pulse … in his neck. MR AGIUS: Did you find one?---No. … Not having found a pulse, did you conclude that he was deceased?---That's what I thought. … And determined that he was deceased?---Yes. …And after that you put handcuffs on him?---Yes. …Why would you handcuff a deceased person? …Well,… we're talking about a drill, standard drill…". 26 The Mahoney Inquiry's transcript contains convincing evidence that when Police SOG's are deployed against any citizen who is making a cry for help in what in a community sense, would normally be seen as perhaps unacceptable behaviour, then the community might well be prepared for a bad outcome for the subject of that call-out, if for no other reason, than directly because of the rigid "standard drill" of SOG's. In an attempt to regain a germ of credibility and justify the 'rigidity' of his SOG "drill" training - the handcuffing of a deceased offenders and here after having first determined the subject deceased, then Mr. Dyson states: "…if I could relate a previous experience that occurred in Aramoowana [sic]… in New Zealand, where a special operations team got into a gun fight with a subject. He was shot six times with nine millimetre rounds. He had one through the left eye and one through the base of his heart and the others had all struck his body. He broke two sets of flexi-cuffs and it took six men to restrain him and he bled to death from the bullet in the heart before he was restrained." - our emphasis 27 This extraordinary testimony raises a number of serious questions. Here a senior member of Tasmania Police SOG, Michael Dyson, - essentially a member of a special police squad, trained to deal with every emergency situation from terrorist attacks on down - has just testified of "a previous experience" at Aramoana in New Zealand! Is Michael Dyson telling us that he, or at least some of his Australian SOG colleagues learnt first hand by this "previous experience"? But consider that here is a policeman with 23 years experience, 10 of those years as an SOG officer, and at Pelverata Assault Team Commander, who is using a 'previous experience' which occurred across the Tasman Sea at Aramoana in New Zealand on 13 November 1990 - to justify his actions at Pelverata Tasmania. Is this not rather strange? Various writings by a number of professional people heavily implicated in all that surrounded the Port Arthur incident, have long ago linked Port Arthur and therefore Tasmania Police, with the shooting by Police of 33-year-old David Malcolm Gray 8 months prior to Pelverata and at Aramoana in New Zealand. Some authors who've investigated, spoken publicly, and written about Port Arthur, have described Aramoana as a try-out for the later Tasman Peninsula operation. At Aramoana, 13 people were shot and killed, including a NZ Police Sgt. Stewart Guthrie, while a further 3 people were injured. It appears even Gray himself linked Aramoana with similar incidents across the Tasman Sea. For at the time it was published, "only hours before Gray began his rampage, he wrote a letter to the editor of New Zealand Guns magazine, in which he referred to the 1987 Hoddle Street, Hungerford [August 1987] , and [December 1987] Queen Street massacres", also of which not so coincidentally exhibit strong links with Port Arthur. Importantly though, it was reported that at Aramoana, quote: an "anti-terrorist unit was deployed in the area at the time". Did this unit have among its number, visiting SOG officers of Tasmania Police? Aramoana was mentioned at least twice more on Day 40 of the Inquiry, in cross-examination of K. A. Rogers (past head of the PSCC), by Mr. Peter Tree, Counsel representing Sergeant Nigel Paul, observer or 'second' that day for the SOG's "senior sniper", Const. Michael Fogarty as well as Counsel Appearing for Richard McCreadie, Mr. Melick, who asked of Rogers, "Are you aware of the Aramarana [sic] incident in New Zealand?---Yes, yes, I am," and again Mr. Rogers' testimony was used reinforce the need for strict drill protocols. 28 Michael Charles Dyson joined the Tasmania Police in 1974, and the SOG in 1985, at which time he got to know Graham Galloway, both of whom trained together in the SOG. Interestingly, we learn from the Inquiry transcript, that while Michael Dyson left the SOG unit in 1995 - before the Port Arthur terrorist attack - he was posted to a special section in the Tasmania Police which was involved directly in, "counter terrorist exercises". It was in this rather covert section, that in his words, his remaining time in Tasmania Police, "involved [him] in the development of the violent incident management plan." - my emphasis. It would seem not entirely improbable to suggest, that at Seascape, on 28-29th April, 1996, the Protective Security Section of Tasmania Police among whom Michael Charles Dyson numbered, had their primary audition before the PSCC, SAC-PAV and ASIO - all of whom were represented - in the shape of a very large field exercise. Although, in the many "despatches" post Port Arthur, Dyson is not mentioned, and with this major incident behind him, he retired from Tasmania Police in August 1997, moving into a private enterprise as a security consultant. 29 Commissioner Mahoney had to tread warily so as to confine his Inquiry within the terms of reference, for he stated, "the Commission's function was not to make a general examination of the Tasmanian police service," but in spite of this fact, he still made a serious indictment against the Tasmania Police, from ordinary constables in the SOG, up to and including senior ranks of police, when he further stated: "No senior officer was in charge; in fact, the senior officer who had been on the site, Inspector Fleming, had already departed without directing who should decide what should, and should not be done. Sergeant Gyselman took over, in effect by default." 30 Further the Commissioner stated that, "Officers of the CIB were in and about the area and their activities made it impossible for Mr Hanuszewicz to satisfy himself of what state the house and the surrounds were in before they were disturbed. …[and his] suspicions were increased by what he was told had occurred and by what he found or did not find at the site." - our emphasis. 31 Added to this disturbing state of affairs is at various times Commissioner Mahoney noted his conclusion that just as Mr. Hanuszewicz had stated, his crime scene investigation was severely compromised directly by the actions of his colleagues, just as was allowed to occur deliberately, at the Broad Arrow Café and outside in bus and car park at the Port Arthur Historic Site, and at Seascape where the BMW and the cottage were deliberately burned. Surely, these documented facts cannot be claimed to be yet further coincidences? The accounts provided by SOG police which substantiated the actions of others implicated in that segment of the siege in which Michael Fogarty discharged the fatal shot through to the arrival of Mr Hanuszewicz at the scene, are at best ambiguous, others may use a more severe term. Apart from the allegation of the empty cartridge case being inserted into the breach of the shotgun, also there was the allegations surrounding the placement of a lead shot in a tree stump by Stan Hanuszewicz under the influence of a senior officer, Insp Thomas Priest, as well as other inconsistent pieces to the jigsaw. On March 13, 1992, Stan's immediate boss, Snr Const Marcus Pearce allegedly had written a report to his superior stating due to ill health, Stan was unfit to give evidence. As mentioned earlier, it was here with Mr Roffe's assistance, Richard McCreadie intervened, admitting a close prior interest in the matter. McCreadie claimed to have uppermost in his mind concerns as to the health of Stan Hanuszewicz. That was shown to a be a hollow claim, for at no time did he seek the advice of his treating doctor, before he instructed Roffe to find him, and he also admitted his intention to hold the summons as, "the vehicle that [he] sought to use" to force Stan to appear as a witness in the Inquest. A rather lethargic search instigated by McCreadie, failed to find any documented allegations against Priest by Stan Hanuszewicz, although he had no trouble in finding a report by Insp Thomas Priest on this incident, and then with it, instructed Mr Roffe "in cryptic," to locate and approach Stan, claiming this intrigue was employed to protect him as a potential "whistleblower"? However the two witnesses, Huxley and Gyselman, that was alleged would collaborate Insp P |
