Holocaust Propaganda is German Hatred

A retired engineer speaks out


ABC Broadcasting Television
7:30 Report
GPO Box 9994
Melbourne 3001
Re.: Interview Kerry O’Brien with a Lady Holocaust Survivor

Dear Sir/Madame

The interview conducted by Mr. Kerry O’Brien on the 7:30 Report about the 19 of May 05 (I am sure it was on a Thursday) was obviously an initiated propaganda clip by others, even more so as the 60 minutes report broadcasted a very similar interview and almost identical footage, with only the Lady Holocaust Survivor someone else, a few days earlier. Was it just a coincident? I couldn’t even imagine that your team of top professionals would come up with such a primitive program in which the purpose of it was so obviously noticed.

That horrible footage was used for war propaganda 60 years ago and most reputable scholars and historians have distanced themselves from that sort of propaganda. I strongly believe that the material used for the program was given to you to pepper up that interview.

However, your viewers are entitled to expect your reporting in particularly on such sensitive subjects to be fair, balanced, honest and objective. That was unfortunately not the case here.

To write about a time of such unparalleled horror is to take a special responsibility for sensitivity – towards Jews, Poles, Germans and all who suffered. No perspective human being can learn about this era without drawing some conclusions about relative guilt and innocence, dishonor and nobility, right and wrong.

As it seems, without engaging ourselves with the many questions concerning the validity of the widely accepted Holocaust narrative, we can safely ask what the Auschwitz Narrative is there to serve. Who benefits from the Auschwitz account? We are entitled to ask why the official Holocaust narrative is so widely promoted by different and opposing political institutions. Is it a result of highly sophisticated and orchestrated Jewish propaganda? I am not so sure anymore.

I am quite sure that the footage of the many unburied human corpses was filmed at the Bergen-Belsen camp about middle of April 1945. It had indeed shocked the world. But scholars and historians have now explained how that tragedy unfolded during the catastrophically last weeks of the war.

What really happened at Belsen:
The Jewish Chronicle, London, published the following Book review on the 6th November 1998
Reviewed by JOHN JACOBS, director of Sussex University's Holocaust Studies course

“Jo Reilly, Belsen (published by Routledge, London, at IF ONE WERE to choose one word guaranteed, for the British, to encapsulate the horrors of the Holocaust, it would be "Belsen." No one who has seen the footage of the piles of corpses being bulldozed into the mass burial pits can ever forget it.

So, it was the newsreels of the liberation of Belsen that brought home to the British public the existence of gas chambers and the Nazi extermination camps and the reality of Hitler's "Final Solution."

Well, no, actually. According to Jo Reilly, it was more the case that reports of the liberation confused the public's understanding of all these points. Belsen had no gas chambers and was not an extermination camp.

If anything, it had been one of the less brutalized camps, since one of its purposes had been to hold some prominent Jews for exchange with interned Germans.

It was only as the flood of inmates from camps in Poland poured into Belsen in the last chaotic months of the war that it took on its familiar, hellish character.

Nor was Belsen linked at the time with the specifically Jewish tragedy, despite the fact that Jews were the majority of the inmates at the liberation. After the war, Belsen became a camp for displaced persons. Reilly describes the struggle between the surviving Jews in the camp to establish their rights as Jews, rather than as nationals of the countries from which they had been deported.

This brought them into conflict with the British government, which wanted to repatriate nationals to their home countries. Clearly this made no sense for Jews.

The British government was loath to concede that Jews were different from other DPs, reasoning that to do so would be to follow Nazi ideology. They were also worried that a strong Jewish presence would inevitably lead to unwelcome pressure for a Jewish homeland.

In the propaganda battles that followed, the British were so afraid of the resonance that the word "Belsen" would have around the world that they renamed the camp Hohne. The Jews, with equal resolution, continued to call it Belsen.

Reilly's analysis is scholarly, meticulously referenced and never less than even-handed. When discussing the British government's obstructive policies, or the less-than-impressive response of Anglo-Jewry to the plight of European Jews after the war, she always explains these "shortcomings" in the context of the prevailing ideologies or political realities -- for example, the delicate position of Anglo-Jewry in the run-up to the creation of Israel and the associated terror campaign against the British.

She provides valuable insights into the aftermath of that uniquely British liberation, both in respect of its meaning for the survivors, who had lost everything, and in terms of the highly charged politics of Anglo-Jewish relations.

Largely because of the circumstances of its liberation, the relatively unimportant German concentration camp of Bergen-Belsen has become -- along with Dachau and Buchenwald -- an international symbol of German barbarism.”

The British troops who liberated the Belsen camp three weeks before the end of the war were shocked and disgusted by the many unburied corpses and dying inmates they found there. Horrific photos and films of the camp's emaciated corpses and mortally sick inmates were quickly circulated around the globe. Within weeks the British military occupation newspaper proclaimed: "The story of that greatest of all exhibitions of 'man's inhumanity to man' which was Belsen Concentration Camp is known throughout the world."

Ghastly images recorded by Allied photographers at Belsen in mid-April 1945 and widely reproduced ever since have greatly contributed to the camp's reputation as a notorious extermination center. In fact, the dead of Bergen-Belsen were, above all, unfortunate victims of war and its turmoil, not deliberate policy. It can even be argued that they were as much victims of Allied as of German measures.

More than 9,000 Jews with citizenship papers or passports from Latin American countries, entry visas for Palestine, or other documents making them eligible for emigration, arrived in late 1943 and 1944 from Poland, France, Holland and other parts of Europe. During the final months of the war, several groups of these "exchange Jews" were transported from Axis-occupied Europe. German authorities transferred several hundred to neutral Switzerland, and at least one group of 222 Jewish detainees was transferred from Belsen (by way of neutral Turkey) to British-controlled Palestine.”

There were some 500 Jewish children in Belsen's "No. 1 Women's Camp" section when British forces arrived. During the final months of the war, tens of thousands of Jews were evacuated to Belsen from Auschwitz and other eastern camps threatened by the advancing Soviets. Belsen became severely overcrowded as the number of inmates increased from 15,000 in December 1944 to 42,000 at the beginning of March 1945, and more than 60,000 a month later. Many of these Jewish prisoners had chosen to be evacuated westwards with their German captors rather than remain in eastern camps to await liberation by Soviet forces.

A semi-official work published in Poland in 1981 claimed that women and babies were "put to death in gas chambers" at Belsen. In 1945 the Associated Press news agency reported:

“In Lueneburg, Germany, a Jewish physician, testifying at the trial of 45 men and women for war crimes at the Belsen and Oswiecim [Auschwitz] concentration camps, said that 80,000 Jews, representing the entire ghetto of Lodz, Poland, had been gassed or burned to death in one night at the Belsen camp”.

As British forces approached Bergen-Belsen, German authorities sought to turn over the camp to the British so that it would not become a combat zone. After some negotiation, it was peacefully transferred, with an agreement that "both British and German troops will make every effort to avoid battle in the area." A revealing account of the circumstances under which the British took control appeared in a 1945 issue of The Journal of the American Medical Association:

By negotiations between British and German officers, British troops took over from the SS and the Wehrmacht the task of guarding the vast concentration camp at Belsen, a few miles northwest of Celle, which contains 60,000 prisoners, many of them political. This has been done because typhus is rampant in the camp and it is vital that no prisoners be released until the infection is checked. The advancing British agreed to refrain from bombing or shelling the area of the camp, and the Germans agreed to leave behind an armed guard which would be allowed to return to their own lines a week after the British arrival.

Martin Broszat, Director of the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, wrote in 1976: “In Bergen-Belsen, for example, British soldiers found thousands of corpses of Jewish prisoners on the day of liberation, which gave the impression that this was one of the notorious extermination camps. Actually, many Jews in Bergen-Belsen as well as in the satellite camps of Dachau died in the last weeks before the end of the war as a result of the quickly improvised retransfers and evacuations of Jewish workers from the still existing ghettos, work camps and concentration camps in the East” (Auschwitz)

Dr. Russell Barton, an English physician who spent a month in Bergen-Belsen after the war with the British Army, has also explained the reasons for the catastrophic conditions found there:

“Most people attributed the conditions of the inmates to deliberate intention on the part of the Germans in general and the camp administrators in particular. Inmates were eager to cite examples of brutality and neglect, and visiting journalists from different countries interpreted the situation according to the needs of propaganda at home."

Michael Wolffsohn, Professor of History at the University of the German Bundeswehr (Army) in Munich, realized that the Jewish side in particular considers the constant remembrance of the Holocaust to be the third main pillar of Jewish identity today, right next to the Jewish religion and Jewish nationalism. This attitude, however, can result in the Jewish side's perpetual consideration of Germany and the German people as 'the enemy', which can only detract from the peaceful co-existence of the two peoples. A discussion thus seems called for regarding the part, which the Holocaust should play in the way Jews see themselves, so that both peoples may share a future relationship based on partnership.

Let us assume for a moment that how and how much do not matter; to an extent, this view is certainly morally justified. Why then is there a need today for official insistence, backed up at least in most countries of Europe with threats of criminal prosecution, that things were exactly as we are being told they were, and not a whit different? If the details really do not matter very much at all, then why is there such adamant refusal to discuss them and to consider other opinions? If no one questions the morally reprehensible nature of the persecution of the Jews per se, why should it not be possible to discuss individual aspects of this persecution in a controversial manner?

Today, German-Jewish relations are dominated by the accounts of suffering between 1933 and 1945. These years seem to have irretrievably poisoned German-Jewish relations, which are marked by a pattern of never-ending accusations on the one side and equally never-ending penitence on the other. What falls by the wayside is any recollection of such events of our common history that have positive value and could serve as a model for future co-existence.

Open Season on Germans

My concern is that there seems to be a perpetual open season on all Germans, as though all Germans must forever bear the guilt and shame of the Nazi regime.

I can bear references to "Nazi Swine," albeit without amusement. But what of my children? Are they, born as Australians, an Australian born mother with Scottish background, to be forever classed "Nazi Swine" in this country?

They too got their share of resentment at their schools.

After all, everything done by the Germans prior to and after World War II is eclipsed by what happened at Auschwitz concentration camp. The argument is always "from Mozart, Beethoven and Wagner to the homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz." That's the card pulled out by anyone who is faced with competition from a German-born Australian or Australian of German descent.

You have no idea what many Germans and their families have to put up with. So far, I have not heard of any public outcries or action taken against this type of incitement, mainly created by that sort of broadcasting which fails to instill holocaust awareness, but rather hatred against a portion of the Australian community.

Many people from a German background have settled in Australia and made a significant contribution to it, including serving in its armed forces against the Nazi regime. Their memory is also vilified. During my time here, I endured continual vilification because of my German origins and countless "Hitler Salutes." However, a chip on the shoulder because of these events does not motivate my complaint to you. Like most Australians, I can take it and abhor the treatment other national groups have received.

If you find my statement about the identity of your footage and pictures to be correct, then I would expect you to explain to your viewers the true story behind the images.

Yours sincerely



----- Original Message -----
From: Mel Fowler
Sent: Sunday, June 26, 2005 10:36 AM

The New Blasphemy

‘Do I "deny the Holocaust"? No! No indeed. I hope the holocaust is not denied and never forgotten. I hope the holocaust is remembered as the greatest propaganda effort and hate campaign ever waged against a civilized people. We must never forget. We must look at the despoliation of our people and our culture and ask: Why do the heavens not darken? We have lost the will and courage to defend ourselves. The time has come to commit the new blasphemy. It is time to deny the gods of the New World Order.’

Tom Blair, The New Blasphemy


----- Original Message -----
From: Mel Fowler
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2005 3:19 PM
Subject: Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?


Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?
by Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun)
London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990


Suvorov's book appears to be absolutely unavailable in the United States, even though, in the fifteen years since it's first printing it has gone through 87 editions in 18 languages!

Someone really doesn't want the American public to learn what that book contains. I have been trying for several years to find a copy - with no luck.

The obvious fact that Jewish organizations have gone to great lengths to prevent Suvorov's book from being read by the American public tells me that they see the information in Suvorov's book as very dangerous to them and their programs.

 It doesn't take a genius to see that they are absolutely right about that. Indeed, that information has the power to undo them down to their socks! If we fail to use this opportunity to deal the enemy a great blow, we can blame only ourselves.

Reviewed by Joseph Bishop

It sometimes happens that the most significant historical works are
virtually ignored by the mainstream press, and consequently reach few
readers. Such is the case with many revisionist studies, including this
important work by a former Soviet military intelligence officer who
defected to the West in 1978. Even before the appearance of this book, he
had already established a solid reputation with the publication of five
books, written under the pen name of Viktor Suvorov, on the inner workings
of the Soviet military, and particularly its intelligence operations.
In Icebreaker Suvorov takes a close look at the origins and development of
World War II in Europe, and in particular the background to Hitler's
"Operation Barbarossa" attack against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.
Since its original publication in Russian (entitled Ledokol) in France in
1988, it has been published in an astonishing 87 editions in 18 languages.
In spite of its importance to the historical record, Icebreaker has
received very little attention in the United States. The few reviews that
have appeared here have been almost entirely brief and dismissive -- a
shameful treatment that reflects the cowardice and intellectual
irresponsibility of a "politically correct" scholarly establishment.
According to the conventional view, Hitler's perfidious attack abruptly
forced a neutral and aloof Soviet Russia into war. This view further holds
that a surprised Stalin had naively trusted the deceitful German Führer.
Rejecting this view as political propaganda, Suvorov shows Stalin's
personal responsibility for the war's outbreak and progression. Above all,
this book details the vast Soviet preparations for an invasion of Europe in
the summer of 1941 with the goal of Sovietizing central and western Europe.
Suvorov is not alone in his view. It is also affirmed by a number of
non-Russian historians, such as American scholar R. H. S. Stolfi in his
1991 study Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted (reviewed by
me in the Nov.-Dec. 1995 Journal).
In spite of rigid Soviet censorship, Suvorov has succeeded in digging up
many nuggets of valuable information from publicly available Soviet
writings that confirm his central thesis. Icebreaker is based on the
author's meticulous scouring of such published sources as memoirs of
wartime Soviet military leaders, and histories of individual Soviet
divisions, corps, armies, fleets, and air units.
'Second Imperialist War'
A central tenet of Soviet ideology was that the Soviet Union, as the
world's first Marxist state and bulwark of "workers' power," would
eventually liberate all of humanity from the yoke of capitalism and fascism
(the "last resort of monopoly capitalism"). While Soviet leaders might
disagree about the circumstances and timing of this process of global
liberation, none doubted the importance of this objective. As Suvorov notes:
For Lenin, as for Marx, world revolution remained the guiding star, and he
did not lose sight of this goal. But according to the minimum program, the
First World War would only facilitate a revolution in one country. How,
then, would the world revolution take place thereafter? Lenin gave a
clear-cut answer to this question in 1916: as a result of the second
imperialist war ...
Initially the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" was made up of only a
handful of constituent republics. Lenin and the other Soviet leaders
intended that more republics would be added to the USSR until it
encompassed the entire globe. Thus, writes Suvorov, "the declaration
accompanying the formation of the USSR was a clear and direct declaration
of war on the rest of the world."
Hitler understood this much better than did the leaders of Britain, France
or the United States. During a conversation in 1937 with Lord Halifax, one
of Britain's most important officials, he said: "In the event of a general
war [in Europe], only one country can win. That country is the Soviet
Union." In Icebreaker, Suvorov explains how in 1939 Stalin exploited the
long-simmering dispute between Germany and Poland over Danzig and the
"Polish Corridor" to provoke a "second imperialist war" that would
enormously expand the Soviet empire.
Stalin anticipated a drawn-out war of attrition in which Germany, France
and Britain would exhaust themselves in a devastating conflict that would
also spark Communist uprisings across Europe. And as the Soviet premier
expected, "Icebreaker" Germany did indeed break up the established order in
Europe. But along with nearly everyone else outside of Germany, he was
astonished by the speed and thoroughness with which Hitler subdued not only
Poland, but also France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway,
Yugoslavia and Greece. Dashing Kremlin expectations that a "second
imperialist war" would quickly usher in a Soviet Europe, by July 1940
Hitler was effectively master of the continent.
Soviet Preparations
Throughout history, every army has had a basic mission, one that requires
corresponding preparations. An army whose mission is basically defensive is
accordingly trained and equipped for defensive war. It heavily fortifies
the country's frontier areas, and employs its units in echeloned depth. It
builds defensive emplacements and obstacles, lays extensive minefields, and
digs tank traps and ditches. Military vehicles, aircraft, weapons and
equipment suitable for defending the country are designed, produced and
supplied. Officers and troops are trained in defense tactics and
counter-offensive operations.
An army whose mission is aggressive war acts very differently. Officers and
troops are trained for offensive operations. They are supplied with weapons
and equipment designed for attack, and the frontier area is prepared
accordingly. Troops and their materiel are massed close to the frontier,
obstacles are removed, and minefields are cleared. Maps of the areas to be
invaded are issued to officers, and the troops are briefed on terrain
problems, how to deal with the population to be conquered, and so forth.
Carefully examining the equipping, training and deployment of Soviet
forces, as well as the numbers and strengths of Soviet weaponry, vehicles,
supplies and aircraft, Suvorov establishes in great detail that the Red
Army was organized and deployed in the summer of 1941 for attack, not defense.
Peculiar Tanks
Germany entered war in 1939 with 3,195 tanks. As Suvorov points out, this
was fewer than a single Soviet factory in Kharkov, operating on a
"peacetime" basis, was turning out every six months.
By 1941 everyone recognized the tank as the primary weapon of an army of
attack in a European land war. During this period, Suvorov shows, the
Soviets were producing large quantities of the well armed "Mark BT" tank,
predecessor of the famed T34 model. "BT" were the initials for the Russian
words "high speed tank." The first of this series had a top speed of 100
kilometers per hour, impressive even by today's standards. But as Suvorov
goes on to note, this weapon had a peculiarity:
Having said so many positive things about the numbers and quality of Soviet
tanks, one must note one minor drawback. It was impossible to use these
tanks on Soviet territory ...Mark BT tanks could only be used in an
aggressive war, only in the rear of the enemy and only in a swift offensive
operation, in which masses of tanks suddenly burst into enemy territory ...
The Mark BT tanks were quite powerless on Soviet territory. When Hitler
began Operation Barbarossa, practically all the Mark BT tanks were cast
aside. It was almost impossible to use them off the roads, even with
caterpillar tracks. They were never used on wheels. The potential of these
tanks was never realized, but it certainly could never have been realized
on Soviet territory. The Mark BT was created to operate on foreign
territory only and, what is more, only on territory where there were good
roads ...
To the question, where could the enormous potential of these Mark BT tanks
be successfully realized, there is only one answer: in central and southern
Europe. The only territories where tanks could be used, after their
caterpillar tracks were removed, were Germany, France and Belgium ...
Caterpillar tracks are only a means for reaching foreign territory. For
instance, Poland could be crossed on caterpillar tracks which, once the
German autobahns had been reached, could then be discarded in favor of
wheels, on which operations would then proceed ...
It is said that Stalin's tanks were not ready for war. That was not so.
They were not ready for a defensive war on their own territory. They were,
however, designed to wage war on others.
Airborne Assault Corps
Similarly designed for offensive war are paratroops. This most aggressive
form of infantry is employed primarily as an invasion force. Germany formed
its first airborne assault units in 1936, and by 1939 had 4,000 paratroops.
And the USSR? Suvorov explains:
By the beginning of the war [1939], the Soviet Union had more than one
million trained paratroopers -- 200 times more than all other countries in
the world put together, including Germany.... It is quite impossible to use
paratroopers in such massive numbers in a defensive war.... No country in
history, or indeed all countries in the world put together, including the
Soviet Union, has ever had so many paratroopers and air assault landing
sub-units as Stalin had in 1941.
As part of the planned invasion, in early 1940 orders were given for
large-scale construction of airborne assault gliders, which were produced
in mass quantity from the spring of 1941 onward. The Soviets also designed
and built the remarkable KT "winged tank." After landing, its wings and
tailpiece were discarded, making the KT instantly ready for combat. The
author also describes a variety of other offense-oriented units and
weapons, and their deployment in June 1941 in areas and jumping-off points
right on the frontiers with Germany and Romania. All these weapons of
offensive war became instantly useless following the Barbarossa attack,
when the Soviets suddenly required defensive weapons.
Suvorov tells of a secret meeting in December 1940 attended by Stalin and
other Politburo members at which General Pavel Rychagov, deputy defense
minister and commander of the Soviet air force, discussed the details of
"special operations in the initial period of war." He spoke of the
necessity of keeping the air force's preparations secret in order to "catch
the whole of the enemy air force on the ground." Suvorov comments:
It is quite obvious that it is not possible to "catch the whole of the
enemy air force on the ground" in time of war. It is only possible to do so
in peacetime, when the enemy does not suspect the danger.
Stalin created so many airborne troops that they could only be used in one
situation: after a surprise attack by the Soviet air force on the airfields
of the enemy. It would be simply impossible to use hundreds of thousands of
airborne troops and thousands of transport aircraft and gliders in any
other situation.
Suvorov also reports on the dismantling in June 1941 of the Soviet frontier
defense systems, and the deployment there of masses of troops and armor
poised for westward attack.
Stalin Preempted
During the period just prior to the planned Soviet invasion, the USSR's
western military districts were ordered to deploy all 114 divisions, then
stationed in the interior, to positions on the frontier. Thus, remarks
Suvorov, June 13, 1941, "marks the beginning of the greatest displacement
of troops in the history of civilization."
Such a massive buildup of forces directly on the frontier simply could not
be kept secret. As Suvorov notes, Wilhelm Keitel, Field Marshal and Chief
of Germany's armed forces High Command, spoke about the German fears during
a postwar interrogation:
All the preparatory measures we took before spring 1941 were defensive
measures against the contingency of a possible attack by the Red Army. Thus
the entire war in the East, to a known degree, may be termed a preventive
war ... We decided ... to forestall an attack by Soviet Russia and to
destroy its armed forces with a surprise attack. By spring 1941, I had
formed the definite opinion that the heavy buildup of Russian troops, and
their attack on Germany which would follow, would place us, in both
economic and strategic terms, in an exceptionally critical situation ...
Our attack was the immediate consequence of this threat ...
In 1941, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov was the Soviet Navy minister, as well as a
member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. In his
postwar memoirs, published in 1966, he recalled:
For me there is one thing beyond all argument -- J. V. Stalin not only did
not exclude the possibility of war with Hitler's Germany, on the contrary,
he considered such a war ... inevitable ... J. V. Stalin made preparations
for war ... wide and varied preparations -- beginning on dates ... which he
himself had selected. Hitler upset his calculations.
Suvorov comments:
The admiral is telling us quite clearly and openly that Stalin considered
war inevitable and prepared himself seriously to enter it at a time of his
own choosing. In other words, Stalin was preparing to strike the first
blow, that is to commit aggression against Germany; but Hitler dealt a
preventive blow first and thereby frustrated all Stalin's plans ...
Let us compare Keitel's words with those of Kuznetsov. Field Marshal Keitel
said that Germany was not preparing an aggression against the Soviet Union;
it was the Soviet Union which was preparing the aggression. Germany was
simply using a preventive attack to defend itself from an unavoidable
aggression. Kuznetsov says the same thing -- yes, the Soviet Union was
preparing for war and would inevitably have entered into it, but Hitler
disrupted these plans with his attack. What I cannot understand is why
Keitel was hanged [at Nuremberg], and Kuznetsov was not.
Suvorov believes that Hitler's preemptive strike came just two or three
weeks before Stalin's own planned assault. Thus, as Wehrmacht forces
smashed Soviet formations in the initial weeks of the "Barbarossa" attack,
the Germans marveled at the great numbers of Soviet tanks and other
materiel destroyed or captured -- an enormous buildup sufficient not just
for an assault on Germany, but for the conquest of all of Europe. Suvorov
Hitler decided that it was not worth his while waiting any longer. He was
the first to go, without waiting for the blow of the "liberating" dagger to
stab him in the back. He had begun the war in the most favorable conditions
which could possibly have existed for an aggressor; but given the nature of
Stalin's grand plan, he could never have won it. Even in the most
unfavorable conditions, the Red Army was able to "liberate" half of Europe ...
As devastating as it was, Hitler's assault was not fatal. It came too late
to be successful. "Even the Wehrmacht's surprise attack on the Soviet Union
could no longer save Hitler and his empire," Suvorov writes. "Hitler
understood where the greatest danger was coming from, but it was already
too late." With great effort, the Soviets were able to recover from the
shattering blow. Stalin succeeded in forming new armies to replace those
lost in the second half of 1941.
As Suvorov repeatedly points out, the widely accepted image of World War
II, and particularly of the roles of Stalin and Hitler in the conflict,
simply does not accord with reality:
In the end ... Poland, for whose liberty the West had gone to war, ended up
with none at all. On the contrary, she was handed over to Stalin, along
with the whole of Eastern Europe, including a part of Germany. Even so,
there are some people in the West who continue to believe that the West won
the Second World War.
... Stalin became the absolute ruler of a vast empire hostile to the West,
which had been created with the help of the West. For all that, Stalin was
able to preserve his reputation as naive and trusting, while Hitler went
down in history as the ultimate aggressor. A multitude of books have been
published in the West based on the idea that Stalin was not ready for war
while Hitler was.
A Soviet Europe?
An intriguing historical "what if" is to speculate on the fate of Europe if
Stalin, and not Hitler, had struck first. For example, a less rapidly
successful German campaign in the Balkans in the spring of 1941 could have
forced the postponement of Barbarossa by several weeks, which would have
enabled Stalin to strike the first blow.
Could German forces have withstood an all-out Soviet assault, with tens of
thousands of Soviet tanks and a million paratroopers? With the advantage of
striking first, how quickly could Stalin have reached Berlin, Amsterdam,
Brussels, Paris, Rome and Madrid? Suvorov writes:
It would be a mistake to underestimate the enormous strength and vast
resources of Stalin's war machine. Despite its grievous losses, it had
enough strength to withdraw and gather new strength to reach Berlin. How
far would it have gone had it not sustained that massive blow on 22 June,
if hundreds of aircraft and thousands of tanks had not been lost, had it
been the Red Army and not the Wehrmacht which struck the first blow? Did
the German Army have the territorial expanse behind it for withdrawal? Did
it have the inexhaustible human resources, and the time, to restore its
army after the first Soviet surprise attack?
Partially answering his own question, Suvorov states: "If Hitler had
decided to launch Operation Barbarossa a few weeks later, the Red Army
would have reached Berlin much earlier than 1945."
Suvorov even presents a hypothetical scenario of a Soviet invasion and
occupation of Europe, replete with Stalinist terror and oppression:
The [Soviet] troops meet endless columns of prisoners. Dust rises on the
horizon. There they are, the oppressors of the people -- shopkeepers,
bourgeois doctors and architects, farmers and bank employees. The Chekists'
[NKVD] work will be hard. Prisoners are cursorily interrogated at every
stopping place. Then the NKVD investigates each one in detail, and
establishes the degree of his guilt before the working people. But by now
it has become necessary to expose the most dangerous of the millions of
prisoners: the former Social Democrats, pacifists, socialists and National
Socialists, former officers, policemen and ministers of religion.
Millions of prisoners have to be sent far away to the east and the north,
in order to give them the opportunity, through honest labor, to expiate
their guilt before the people ...
In Suvorov's scenario, a camp called Auschwitz is captured early on by the
advancing Soviets. In response to the question, "Well, what was it like in
Auschwitz, pal?," a Red Army man replies: "'Nothing much, really' The
worldly-wise soldier in his black jacket shrugs his shoulders. 'Just like
at home. Only their climate is better'."
Actually, "what if" historical speculation is normally uncertain because
key factors are often simply imponderable. In this case, one such factor is
Soviet morale. While it is certainly true that Soviet troops fought bravely
and tenaciously in 1941-1943 defending their home territory, they may not
have fought with the same fervor and morale in an invasion of Europe. The
tenacity and endurance shown by Red Army troops in Hungary and Germany in
1944 and 1945 is not necessarily indicative, because these soldiers were
bitterly mindful of more than two years of savage fighting against the
invaders, and of stern occupation, on their home territory.
Another imponderable is the response of Britain and the United States to an
all-out Soviet invasion of Europe. If Soviet forces had struck westward in
July 1941, would Britain and the United States have sided with Stalin and
the USSR, or would they have sided with Hitler and Germany, Italy, France,
Romania, Finland, Hungary, Denmark, and the rest of Europe? Or would
Roosevelt and Churchill have decided to remain aloof from the great conflict?
Anyway, when Hitler did launch his preemptive strike against Soviet Russia,
Roosevelt and Churchill immediately sided with Stalin, and when the Red
Army took half of Europe in 1944-45, neither the British nor the American
leader objected.
What can now be stated with certainty -- thanks to the work of Suvorov and
other revisionist historians -- is that in smashing the great Soviet
military buildup in 1941, Hitler dashed Stalin's plan to quickly conquer
Europe, and that, in spite of his defeat in 1945, Hitler saved at least the
western half of Europe, and tens of millions of people, from the horrors of
Soviet subjugation.

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