German

Sylvia Stolz proudly at work

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In Geschäftsführung ohne Auftrag für das Deutsche Reich

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Sylvia Stolz

Rechtsanwältin

Hindenburgallee 11

85560 Ebersberg

Tel / Fax: 08092 / 244 18  

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Sylvia Stolz’s Karlsruhe Beschwerde (Complaint and Appeal)

Translated by James M. Damon

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Acting as Uncommissioned Agent for the Reich,

Sylvia Stolz

Attorney at Law

Hindenburgallee 11

85560 Ebersberg

TO:

Karlsruhe Superior District Court

Third Division Criminal Court of Appeal

76133 Karlsruhe

Ebersberg 10. April 2006

In this matter, which concerns me personally, I explain the reasons for the urgent appeal which I submitted by FAX on 7 April 2006 .

The appeal, which includes a motion to lift a contested decision, results from the ruling of the Superior District Court of Karlsruhe entered on 31 March.

This was an appeal of the ruling of the  Mannheim 6^th Criminal Court dated 9 March 2006 , excluding me from participating in the defense of Citizen of the Reich Ernst Zündel against charges of incitement.

The contested ruling is based on a basic  misunderstanding of the law.

The judges of the Third Court of Criminal Appeals did not take up a single point concerning the problems arising from the directorship of Dr. Meinerzhaben in the Zündel case.

From the outset, the course of the main hearing was characterized by conflict.

The court was uncompromising in its determination to suppress forensic evidence, while the attorney for the defense was equally determined to fulfill her professional obligation to establish empirical truth in the interest of the defendant.

In the ruling I was admonished that the attorney for the defense must act as “an organ of the court, bound to pursue justice and support the law;” and the Court then evaluated my conduct as “obstructing the Court in its determination of the truth” (the gist of page 9 of the ruling.)

I can conceive of this only as a monstrously cynical reversal of the truth.

The expressed determination of the Sixth Superior Criminal Court of Mannheim District is extremely remote from determining empirical truth.

Its relationship to the truth is one of hostile rejection; its hostility to the truth is so palpable that one can grasp it in one’s hands.

At the beginning of the main proceedings, the court expressed in written form its firm intention to disallow the procedural submission of evidentiary motions which could have the purpose of accomplishing either of these two things:

1. proving that provisions relating to “Incitement”(Article 130 of Penal Code), which clearly emanate from foreign domination of the Bundesrepublik, are in violation of international law; and

2.     demonstrating that the “Manifest Obviousness of the Holocaust” is  mere sham and pretense.

It needs no elucidation that Ernst Zündel must be absolved if the prosecution acknowledges that the underlying threats of sanctions are violations of international law, and/or the condemnation of the German Nation for alleged genocide against the Jews is built upon a gigantic propaganda lie.[1]

The fact that it is the duty of the defense to orient the proceedings, by means of appropriate motions, toward verification of the evidence it presents, must be just as obvious -- provided the accused does not bow down before the prosecution’s lies.

This duty of the defense is not lifted simply because success seems unlikely, particularly when the defendant is supported by the preponderance of evidence.

In the present instance, the great obstacle for the Defense lies in the allegiance of the Court to the powers of foreign domination and its corresponding efforts to maintain the Great Lie of “Holocaust.”

Since the Mannheim Sixth Superior Criminal Court, in obedience to its anticipation of the expectations of Judaism, has used the instrumentality of court proceedings to bar forensic truth from being submitted as evidence, the defense has no opportunity to apply Section 138 of the Penal Code.

The suspicion that is required for removal of a defense attorney is described in Section 138a Paragraph 1 Nr. 3 Penal Code, Begünstigung bzw. Strafvereitelung (favoritism or evasion of punishment.)

This requires that the attorney must have “obstructed the determination of truth” in defending her client, thereby hindering realization of the state’s demand for punishment.

Obviously this requirement is not present in the Zündel case.

The state’s demand for punishment can be realized only by means of a criminal trial oriented toward discovery of truth.

It is derived directly from a concept of punishment that is free of every trace of vengeance and lynch justice.

Any harm done to the accused through arbitrary procedures and bending the law is not punishment, but rather duress, deprivation of liberty, and murder.

The defense attorney who interrupts a “lynching party” deserves to have the society of laws on her side.

Consider what such an attorney is accomplishing by interrupting the legal crime:

Like the geese who saved the Roman Capitol, she screams murder and mayhem[2] in order to awaken her fellow citizens from their sleep so they will assist her and come to the rescue of both the accused and the nation of laws.

If this attorney is removed from the defense by the Superior District Court, then Section 138a of the Penal Code will be drawn down into the maelstrom of legal perversion.

I have informed the Third Criminal Court of Appeals of Superior District Court Karlsruhe of my views in my detailed position papers of 20 and 26 March 2006 , as well as my presentation in the oral proceedings of 27 March 2006 .

Here is an excerpt from my position paper of 20 March:

The Rule of Procedure for Criminal Trials was announced as Justizgesetz des Deutschen Reiches (Law Governing Justice Administration of the German Reich) on 1 February 1877 , in the Reich Legal Gazette of 1877 pages 475--.

It is still valid legal procedure of the Reich, and I acknowledge its continuing validity.

The alterations adopted by the Bundestag are not legally binding, for the reasons I give below.

However, in view of actual existing power relations, they must be obeyed, since they result from the foreign domination of Germany .

That is, they must be obeyed insofar as they do not conflict with international law and are helpful for the orderly conduct of criminal trials before the courts of the OMF-BRD.

Given this criteria, I feel obligated to respect and follow the criminal legal procedure of the courts of the OMF-BRD regarding my activities as defense attorney, including the changes added by the Bundestag.

However, in the extraordinary situation that a court of the OMF-BRD publicly allows the following abuses to occur, which are obvious and clearly recognizable by every reasonable and intelligent citizen of the Reich, namely allowing arbitrary caprice to prevail, disrespecting international law, and violating  the most fundamental rules of establishing  truth and pursuing justice, then it becomes necessary to pursue a defense strategy that “scandalizes” the legal and procedural violations, in order to expose the situation to public attention and make it understandable to the public.

This implies nothing other than making the scandal that was created by the conduct of the Court, visible as such.

The disruptions of proceedings first went unnoticed as such, since they were disguised as conduct of court proceedings.

In fact, Dr. Meinerzhagen and his fellow judges caused and created them deliberately.

The reaction of the defense, which was quite appropriate to these violations of judicial procedure, made the arbitrariness of the Court quasi visible.

Such a strategy is required In the Zündel case, even though it may not be prescribed in judicial procedure.

The conduct of the 6^th Superior Criminal Court of Mannheim required a supra legal emergency response.

This is because Ernst Zündel’s freedom and possibly his life are in dire jeopardy.

His position appears well nigh hopeless since no relief can be expected, even from the Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court).

The Supreme Court itself is open to suspicion of participating in assaults on the German nation, particularly in the area of criminalizing political activities, on account of its well known decision BGHSt 46, 37 – 48; 47, 278 – 285.

Dr. Meinerzhagen and his colleagues refer specifically to these decisions.

Such assaults on political freedom are illegal under international law; however, it would be entirely in keeping with the character  of the Supreme Court to act as an organ of foreign domination.

In support of this point, I stated the following in my position paper of 26 March 2006 :

The Court is proceeding on the assumption (see bottom of page 20) that “from the outset, any fulfillment of the legally prescribed task of the Defense, by use of procedural laws or in any other way with reference to this defense activity, can never be appropriate to the facts of the case.”

The Court’s assessment of my conduct of the defense that deviates from this does so because it rests upon an arbitrary narrowing of the judicial horizon.

Dr. Meinerzhagen and his colleagues treat all questioning of the legitimacy of the Bundesrepublik, even when based on purely legal arguments, as conduct alien to the defense; and they treat all attempts to refute the manifest obviousness of “Holocaust” in the same way, even when these attempts are motions to present forensic evidence.

This causes Dr. Meinerzhagen and colleagues to be caught in the logical trap of circular reasoning.

They are unable to consider that the Defense might have any motives other than that of sabotaging the trial.

Even if we considered it permissible for the Court  to assume, without questioning the legality of the assumption, that the Bundesrepublik were in fact the legitimate nation state of the Germans, and that the “Holocaust” were manifestly obvious, an attack on these assumptions by the Defense would still not be “alien to the defense” if the truth of the opposing contention would lead to acquittal.

The Third Court of Appeals of Karlsruhe Superior District Court has not considered these arguments – at least, not in any verifiable form.

On Page 16 of its ruling the Court states the following:

The Court of Appeals has carefully considered the arguments of Attorney Sylvia Stolz but is unable to act upon them.

The Court does not tell us what considerations keep it from being able to act on my arguments.  However, it is very clear that it

has not met the requirement for making a judicial decision (Section 34 Penal Code, Art. 20 III of Basic Law.)

It is true that the Court is not required to take up every single matter brought before it.[3]  However, if it has seen occasion to “carefully consider” my arguments, then it is required also make known the essential content of its consultations in order to establish contestability for its decision.[4]

It was extremely important that the Court of Appeals state its position on the questions of factuality and law which I raised, since its position concerns the fundamental questions involved in reaching a verdict.

The legal issues that I have raised here are derived from Article 146 of Basic Law.

They concern the jurisdiction and continuing administration of justice by the so called “Constitutional Court” of the Bundesrepublik as it relates to the continuation of the Reich, and specifically the expert opinions of universally acknowledged authorities on statehood and international law  such as “Father of the Federal Republic” Prof. Carlo Schmid, Prof. Friedrich Berber und Prof. Otto Kimminich.

The issues concern their positions and opinions concerning the Hague Convention on Land Warfare; [5] the interventionist (and therefore illegal under international law) character of the continuing occupation of the German Reich; 

the continuing existence of the German Reich; the nature of the Bundesrepublik as an “Organizational Form of a Modality of Foreign Rule” (Prof. Carlo Schmid’s formulation); and the continuing legitimacy of Reich law and culpability of German collaborators for their crimes against the interests of the Reich.

The differences between OMF/BRD and the German Reich, that is, the nonidentity of OMF with the Reich, have never, to the best of my knowledge, been dealt with in German judicial literature.

Rather, OMF-BRD procedure seems to have been simply adopted as a kind of prevailing theory.

It has been accompanied by a kind of “Versenkung” (sinking.) Reich law and procedure have sunk out of view, disappearing as result of the camouflage strategy adopted by the opinion making mass media.

If there were significant opposing legal opinions concerning the complex of issues I have raised, the prosecution would certainly have brought them into the field and used them against me.

It is obvious that the Third Court of Appeals of the Superior District Court of Karlruhe has no such arguments, and this explains its silence.

Against this background it is highly suspicious that the banishment of the defense was so clumsily based upon the argument that my motion to instruct the jurists on 9 February 2006 , was an attempt to “mislead the lay judges.”[6]

On account of constant interruptions by Dr. Meinerzhagen, I was unable to read this motion in its entirety during the main proceedings.

Therefore I included it among the other documents as Enclosure 05 

It reads as follows:  

In the Criminal Case of Ernst Zündel

LG Mannheim 6 KLs 503 Js 4/96

I hereby move / to instruct the lay judges 

1.       That they are collaborating in a show trial is designed to repress the German nation  and is illegal under international law; and further that  they thereby make themselves liable for prosecution for the crime of slandering the Nation (Section 90 f of Reich Criminal Code) and or aiding the enemy (Section 91b Reich Law Book) – likewise i.d.F. of 1944 

2.     That under existing international law, they can be made to answer before the courts of the German Reich on account of their actions [7] 

3.      That the oath found in  Section 45 Paragraph 3 DRiG (Deutsches Richtergesetz, Gesamtausgabe) “I swear to faithfully carry out the duties of an honorary judge in true allegiance to the Basic Law of the Bundesrepublik “ is a violation of Article 45 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, and therefore not binding on the lay judges.

The provisions of the Reich Penal Code quoted here read as follows:

Section 90 of Reich Penal Code

Whoever publicly or in a foreign country, expresses an untrue or slanderous opinion in serious mien, shall be punished with imprisonment, as shall anyone seriously threatening the dignity of the German nation.  

Section 91 b

Whoever, in Germany or as a German in a foreign country,  during a war against the Reich or regarding a threatening war, aids or abets the Enemy, or damages the war effort of the Reich or that of an ally, shall be punished with either death or life imprisonment.

 

If the criminal act results in an insignificant disadvantage to the Reich and its allies, and an insignificant advantage for the enemy,  and if the criminal act can not have had serious consequences, then a prison sentence of not less than two years is  prescribed.

The Hague agreement concerning laws and customs of land warfare dated 18 October 1907 , version of 25 January 1910 , came into effect for the German Reich / on 26 January 1910 .

The Hague Agreement on Land Warfare specifies in Article 45 that 

“It is forbidden to compel the population of an occupied region to swear an oath of allegiance to an enemy power.

I. General Remarks Concerning the Obligation to Instruct Lay Judges Concerning the dealings of nations with regard to citizens who are ignorant of the law, it is clear that a sovereign power has an obligation to point out risks that are inherent in utilizing private persons  as assistants to the administration.

This is especially true when the danger exists that the private individual might incur punishment for not knowing his rights and duties regarding the government.

The legally binding obligation to instruct the citizenry (for example § 136 I on pages 2-4 und §§ 57, 72 Criminal Rules of Procedure) is one expression of this general principle of law.

By analogy, it is applicable to vested interests that were not known to the lawmakers during the  formulation of criminal trial procedure.

II. The Legal Obligation Regarding the Conduct of Professional Judges That Arise From Past Activities.

The present case contains an intensified obligation of the kind we are discussing regarding past activities of officials that might have endangered them.

These officials have instructed the lay judges to involuntarily (Inversion of Argument § 35 i.V.m. § 77 GVG) act as judges without informing them of the following:

1.       That the German Reich continues to exist , although at the moment it is unable to conduct its own affairs;

2.       That the “Bundesrepublik” is not identical to the German Reich[8];

3.       That the legal system of the German Reich continues to be in effect, although its actions continue to be hindered by the armed might of the victorious powers;

4.       That the Bundesrepublik is an illegal construct of occupation under international law.  In the words of Carlo Schmidt, it is nothing more than the “organizational form of a modality of foreign rule” and therefore can have no legal status in the territories of the German Reich.  It has no legitimate significance – only that of actual existence.

5.        That the present German government, including all its organs that have been designed to mimic a real state, can not serve even as a de facto government of the German nation;[9]

6.       That the enemies of the Reich are continuing their war of annihilation against the German nation behind the state trappings of “Federal Republic of Germany” with the object of completely wiping it out, and that these lay judges are being used as unsuspecting tools toward this end.

Against the background of a brainwashing that has continued for 60 years and created in German minds a false picture of history (even producing an anti German world view among the Germans), this omission can have far reaching consequences for the lay judges.

Because of the omission, they are denied the opportunity of evaluating their situation and inherent risks.

In particular they fail to realize that by participating in the proceedings against Ernst Zündel, they are committing treason against the German people and contributing to its spiritual destruction by enemies of the Reich.

To be more exact:  Because of the omission, the jurists do not realize that they are not acting on behalf of a German court and that they are not applying German law.

They do not realize that they are participating as mere extras in a show trial of a citizen of the German Reich who has been persecuted by enemies of the Reich for decades on account of his nonviolent struggle on behalf of the reestablishment of the honor of the German Nation and transported against his will from his home in the USA by way of Canada to the jurisdiction of the OMF/BRD.

The defense will show in the main proceedings that the existence of the “Federal Republic”  is a long lasting violation of international law, and that the “Holocaust Muzzle” (§ 130 Abs. 3 StGB-BRD) is judicial makeshift, a construct developed in violation of international law to repress German defenses against the continuing destruction of the German psyche.

This will not lessen the danger threatening the lay judges, but greatly increase it.

This is because they were formerly able to rationalize their collaboration in the destruction of the German nation on grounds that, as judicial laypeople, were unable to judge the complexity of the defense arguments.

On the other hand, the Reich court would deny the excuse that they had known nothing about what was going on and so were acting in good faith regarding their collaboration in the persecution of Ernst Zündel.

The criminal case against Ernst Zündel will go down in history as one of the great “witch trials” of the 21^st Century.

Those who participate in persecuting this trailblazer of historical veracity can not depend on their acts and names passing into oblivion.

It is much more likely that they themselves will have to answer as an example before the courts of the Reich so that it can demonstrate its regained capacity to function in the area of jurisprudence and thus reinstate popular trust in German justice.

The explanation of this point of view was derived from the  motion to postpone the trial, which was intended to be read separately.

The following excerpts from the defense brief, written by the undersigned on 18 October 2005 , are already known to the presiding judge and court reporter:

III.

Ernst Zündel has is entitled to demand the instruction of the lay judges concerning the dismissal of charges (§ 1004 BGB analog). 

The actions of the enemies of the Reich, which are illegal under international law, have exposed Ernst Zündel to the danger of being deprived of his freedom for many years by unsuspecting tools of foreign rule.

The deliberate creation of this dangerous situation is a serious violation of his Lebensgüter (equities in life), which are protected under the laws of the Reich.

In this stage of persecution, the principal danger is coming from  professional judges who have been enlisted to do the will of the foreign power occupying Germany .

As citizens of the Reich, their duty is to assist fellow citizens who are threatened by the enemy (§ 323c StGB).

The law requires that they assist the lay judges by “opening their eyes” to the basic explanations in the defense brief of 18 October 2005 .

Once they are able to see clearly and perceive the situation, the lay judges will fulfill their duty to come to the assistance of their endangered fellow citizen, since they are also citizens of the Reich.  

Mannheim , 8 November 2005

Sylvia Stolz

Attorney at Law

****

When I submitted this, I intended only to draw attention to the existing legal situation.

After intensive consideration, I pointed out how, the legal questions resulting from the military defeat of the German Reich appear to me.

Unfortunately the jurists of the socalled courts of the OMF-BRD are interpreting the proper and dutiful activities of the defense attorney as nothing more than “confusing the lay judges!”

But, what was their actual duty and obligation?

In order to remedy the “confusion of lay judges,” they should have analyzed the legal situation and informed the lay judges of the results of their investigation, if this were really their concern.

But they neglected their duty – for obvious reasons.

After all, what would they have had to explain to the lay judges?

The motion had put them in a position in which they had to discuss concrete questions.

Protocol demands that the answers would have to be treated as “significant formal elements of the case,” or at least retained in a documented footnote or remark.

This requirement of documenting a legal point or argument  exposes the jurists of the OMF-BRD to a significant danger:

They would unequivocally have to ignore the continuing pronouncement of law by the Federal “Constitutional” Court, thereby  ignoring the continued existence of the Reich; declare the Basic Law to be a Constitution  and thereby ignore Article 146 of Basic Law, with its determination that the Basic Law is not a constitution; and pronounce the explanations of Prof. Dr. Carlo Schmid as invalid.  Prof. Schmid, the “Father of the Bundesrepublik” carefully explained that the Federal Republic is not a state, but rather an “organizational form of a modality of foreign rule” and thus a violation of international law forced upon Germany by its victorious enemies.  By doing this they would debase the lay judges with deliberately false instructions, turning them into spineless tools of treachery.  They would be clearly and openly committing treason against their country.

According to Reich law they would have to expect accountability for their crime, as soon as the present form of foreign rule loses its power to hinder the functioning of the Reich.

For the informed and attentive observer, this return of functionality is already coming into view.

In some instances, the OMF jurists have reacted with unadulterated hatred, especially the 6^th  Superior Criminal Court of Mannheim.

They speak of “incitement” and “slandering the Federal Republic ” and even threaten criminal prosecution.

It is as though these traitors and collaborators had slept through all the lectures on state, national and criminal law during their days as law students.

Similarly, the socalled “ Federal Constitutional Court ” has established a “Constitutional Complaint” that even includes a “penalty for misuse” in the amount of 1500 Euros.[10]

In most cases, however, the outcome has been a continuance of the trial, and this has occurred even in “ Constitutional Court .”

The latter has allowed “Constitutional” appeals (that is, appeals dealing with the irreconcilability of  Section 130 Paragraph III of Penal Code with Article 5 of Basic Law) to continue for years without conclusion.

In May of 2005, Holocaust jurists responded openly with an article in the Neuen Juristischen Wochenschrift (New Judicial Weekly) NJW Heft 21/2005, pages 1476-.

The article flowed from the pen of Chief Judge Dr. Günter Bertram of Hamburg District Court, himself an experienced campaigner on the Holocaust front.

He begins his elucidation with the following confession:

“Section 130 of the Penal Code contains irregular emergency law.

Therefore, and insofar as this is true, it contradicts constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and opinion.

Sixty years after the end of the Third Reich, it is imperative that German lawmakers bring about a change of direction.

They must abandon their “Sonderweg” (peculiar path) if they want to meet the normal standards of a nation of laws.”

 

Bertram accuses the “ Constitutional Court ” of refusing to take a position regarding Section 130, Paragraph 3 of the Penal Code “irregardless of concerns that have grown ever more intense and insistent.” 

The matter is especially significant for the court system, since it clearly poses the imperative of suspending the endless Holocaust trials, at least temporarily.

By means of  a resolution to submit evidence under Article 100 of the Basic Law, it would pass this “Schwarzer Peter” (the card one wants to get rid of) to the “ Constitutional Court .”

What happens if an OMF “judge” is guided by his conscience, and arrives at the same conviction as I have?

What if he, loyal to his duty and in accordance with his oath, then acts on the strength of his conviction?

Like General Reinhard Günzel of the Bundeswehr, he would immediately feel the hard fist of foreign rule and be driven from office.

Would this be a confirmation or refutation of the opinions I have presented here?

The OMF jurists are obviously aware of this dilemma.

They show this awareness by inevitably refusing to take a position regarding these questions.

The pattern is perfectly consistent.

Thus far, there has not been a single instance in which a judge confronted this question, from Amtsrichter all the way up to the judges of the “ Constitutional Court .”

It is entirely appropriate to speak of a conspiracy of silence here.

However, this conspiracy rests on a false assumption.

Neither the Supreme Court nor the “ Constitutional Court ” will be able to protect the Holocaust jurists from their deserved punishment.

The power to punish treason rests with the German nation, which most certainly will not allow this attempt to destroy the spirit of our nation to go unpunished as soon as it can again assert itself in the struggle against the enemy.

The cowardly judges serving the OMF will never be able to change the legal situation I have described.

Despite their treachery, the situation will continue the same as it is.

And even if the OMF judges, in order to continue receiving their blood money from the enemy, should today unanimously share this legal insight, it must still change course, since not all OMF judges are scoundrels.[11]

Many OMF judges are suffering conscience pangs, and some of them are going to show courage and discontinue collaboration with the enemy.

When that happens, some dams will break.

Those judges who hesitate too long will drown in the flood of liberated popular anger.  

What really occurred at Mannheim ?

The Third Court of Appeals of the Superior District Court of Karlsruhe used the events of the main proceedings against Ernst Zündel in 6^th Superior Court of Mannheim District to remove me from the defense team.

Now the Mannheim Court ’s determination to rigorously suppress any defense of the accused that might be worthy of the name, has been realized, under cover of quoting maxims from the Supreme Court.[12]

The Superior District Court has closed its eyes to this, however.

It acts as though Dr. Meinerzhagen in Mannheim were directing a fair and impartial criminal trial with the goal of establishing truth.

My references to Dr. Meinerzhagen’s deceptive practices, including those in my oral presentation, were dismissed by Mr. Bauer, the chairman of the Third Court of Appeals in Karlsruhe .

He remarked that the Court was not interested in the conduct of Dr. Meinerzhagen.

He said the Court is interested in my conduct of the defense, and nothing else.

Mr. Bauer might not realize it, but his remark clearly shows that he and the entire Karlsruhe Court of Appeals has completely failed to grasp the legal situation.

The Karlsruhe Court did not realize the fact that both the disorderly conduct of Dr. Meinerzhagen and my reaction to it are a unit, growing arising from the same incident, and therefore cannot be divided.

One part cannot be judged separately from the other.

The role played by Dr. Meinerzhagen and colleagues is the defining moment in the main trial, therefore it must be considered more closely.

The ruling of the  Mannheim Court of 7 November 2005 contains the allegation that the alleged genocide of Jews, called “Holocaust,” is “assumed to be the facts of the case” in Section 130 III of the OMF-BRD Penal Code, and that any submission of evidence that would tend to deny it is therefore ruled out. (page 2.)

We must emphasize the circumstance that the Mannheim judges can refer to a decision by the Supreme Court in support of their contention. [13]

It would be a dereliction of duty bordering on treachery toward his client if a defending attorney in this situation should reassure himself with the thought that a higher authority might come to the rescue of his client.

The bending of the law inherent in the “assumption regarding the facts of the case” found in Section 130 Paragraph 3 of the Penal Code is derived directly from this “higher authority,” and it would be a miracle if a change of heart should come about in this case in the critical time frame.

Our foreign masters leave nothing to chance.

There can be no doubt that they been careful to allow only such judges to advance to the OMF Supreme Court, whose loyalty as vassals is beyond doubt.

Any vestigial traces of the German spirit are be expected least of all from such as these.

In this connection we are reminded of  Adolf Hitler’s penetrating observations that he made in a similarly critical situation of our nation.

Beginning on page 759 of “Mein Kampf” he writes the following:

The Armistice of November 1918 ushered in a policy that was bound to lead gradually to total submission.  Historical examples of a similar kind show that nations which lay down their arms without compelling reasons prefer in the ensuing period to accept the greatest humiliations and extortions rather than attempt to change their fate by a renewed resort to force.

This is humanly understandable.  A shrewd victor will, if possible, always present his demands to the vanquished in installments. And then, with a nation that has lost its character (and this is the case of every one which voluntarily submits) the victor can be sure that the defeated nation will not regard one more of these individual oppressions as an adequate reason for taking up arms again. The more extortions are willingly accepted in this way, the more unjustified it strikes the citizens to finally defend themselves against a new, apparently isolated, though constantly recurring, oppression, especially when, all in all, so much more and greater misfortune has already been borne in patient silence.  The fall of Carthage is the most horrible picture of such a slow execution of a people through its own deserts.

That is why Clausewitz in his “Drei Bekenntnisse” (Three Declarations) in his incomparable fashion, singles out this idea and nails it fast for all time, when he says:  ‘'The stain of a cowardly submission can never be effaced; this drop of poison in the blood of a people is passed on to posterity and will paralyze and undermine the strength of later generations…  On the other hand, even the loss of this freedom after a bloody and honorable struggle assures the rebirth of a people and is the seed of life from which some day a new tree will strike fast roots.”

Of course, a people that has lost all honor and character will not concern itself with such teachings. For no one who takes them to heart can sink so low; only he who forgets them, or no longer wants to know them, collapses. Therefore, we must not expect those who embody a spineless submission suddenly to look into their hearts and, on the basis of reason and all human experience, begin to act differently than before. On the contrary, it is these men in particular who will dismiss all such teachings until either the nation is definitely accustomed to its yoke of slavery or until better forces push to the surface, to wrest the power from the hands of the infamous spoilers. In the first case these people usually do not feel so badly, since not seldom they are appointed by the shrewd victors to the office of slave overseer, which these spineless natures usually wield more mercilessly over their people than any foreign beast put in by the enemy himself.

The development since 1918 shows us that in Germany the hope of winning the victor's favor by voluntary submission unfortunately determines the political opinions and the actions of the broad masses in the most catastrophic way. I attach special importance to emphasizing the broad masses, because I cannot bring myself to profess the belief that the commissions and omissions of our people's leaders are attributable to the same ruinous lunacy. As the leadership of our destinies has, since the end of the War, been quite openly furnished by Jews, we really cannot assume that faulty knowledge alone is the cause of our misfortune; we must, on the contrary, hold the conviction that conscious purpose is destroying our nation. And once we examine the apparent madness of our nation's leadership in the field of foreign affairs from this standpoint, it is revealed as the subtlest, ice-cold logic, in the service of the Jewish idea and struggle for world conquest.

The “Tatbestandliche Voraussetzung“ (Assumption Regarding the  Facts of the Case) Concerning “Holocaust” is Bending the Law

In my personal response to Dr. Meinerzhagen’s personal attack on me, which I delivered in the session of 9 March, I stated the following:

“Let us put this to a little test.

Given this assumption regarding the facts of the case, would not a judge still be required to rule in a Holocaust Denial case, even If he himself (possibly after reading a scientific study such as Germar Rudolf’s “Lectures on the Holocaust”) were convinced that the “Holocaust Industry” is a Jewish fabrication?[14]

Such a ruling would constitute a verdict against the truth as perceived by the judge.   

Any judge who issued such a verdict would be breaking his sworn oath, namely: “I swear to the best of my knowledge and conscience to judge and to pursue no ends except truth and justice.”

Would Dr. Meinerzhagen, Mr. Hamm and Ms. Dörr-Krebs (judges in the present Zündel trial) sign statements to the effect that in such a situation, they would judge and act in violation of the oath they took as judges? 

This would be extremely unlikely.

The point to be made is: in reaching his verdict, a judge’s misgivings about “Holocaust” clearly constitute a hindrance to his deciding against conviction.  When this happens in a trial, the efforts of the defense to create precisely this obstacle by means of verifiable evidence cannot legitimately be suppressed as “alien to the defense.” 

A motion to present such evidence would in fact be the Königsweg (High Road) to a verdict of “not guilty,” thus making it incumbent upon counsel to follow this very path. 

In view of this, do the above named jurists still persist in their illegal and unethical refusal to consider evidence?  Do they prefer to leave it to chance and co-incidence, whether or not, on basis of his personal knowledge, a judge has doubts concerning “Holocaust?”

The only way this thought-experiment can be rejected as unacceptable is by accepting the proposition that doubts about “Holocaust” are unthinkable.

One has to assume that “Holocaust,” in defiance of the teachings of René Descartes (the father of modern epistemology) simply can not be doubted. [15]

Only if the sentence “The Holocaust can be doubted” could be logically proven false, would a judge blessed with normal human intelligence fail to have doubts about “Holocaust,” or fail to be persuaded that “Holocaust” has been pretended since the very beginning.

However, if it can not be ruled out that a person applying sound reasoning can conclude that “Holocaust” is nothing but a lie, then it can not logically be ruled out that such a conviction can be adopted by judges as well, since judges are human.

Or is there someone who maintains that all judges lack the capacity for rational thought?

Who will climb into the ring and prove René Descartes wrong?

It was Descartes who demonstrated that man can doubt everything except one thing: namely that he thinks, since he is doubting; and that he exists, since he thinks (cogito ergo sum).

I am not the only one who is of the opinion that it is possible to challenge the “Manifest Obviousness of Holocaust” with objective evidence.

The Petition Committee of the Bundestag shares this opinion as well.

This committee’s Beschlußempfehlung (recommendation for a ruling) Pet 4-12-07-45-5699 (Deutscher Bundestag 12. Wahlperiode – Drucksache 12/2849), which by  the way was suggested by a “revisionist,” states the following:

The petitioner requests a more specific explanation of the prerequisites for application of the doctrine of Manifest Obviousness, as provided in Section 244 of Penal Code.

In view of this request the Petition Committee refers to the fact that,  in accordance with Section 244 Paragraph 2 of the Penal Code, the Criminal Court, in order to determine the truth, is required to take evidence as part of its office.

This includes all facts and material evidence that are of significance in making the decision.

According to Section 244 Paragraph 3, Sentence 2 of the Criminal Code, one exception exists in which such presentations of evidence are concerned.

The presentations become unnecessary in case of “Manifest Obviousness.”

Such manifestly obvious facts can be common knowledge with which  reasonable persons normally are endowed, or concerning which they can easily inform themselves from reliable sources and without need of specialized knowledge.

In addition, facts known by the Court to be true can also qualify as “manifestly obvious.”

These include such facts as the Court in the course of its official functions

has reliably taken into experience.

Thus the Supreme Court has acknowledged  the assumption of Gerichtskundigkeit (“known to the court”) as “unthinkable” in areas which are themselves the background of events, and yet create grounds for a larger number of similar crimes.

However, the assumption of manifest obviousness never unreasonably limits the possibilities of defense for the accused.

The Court has the obligation of discussing such facts as it considers “manifestly obvious” in the main proceedings, thereby giving the accused the possibility of taking a position.

Furthermore we must consider that “Manifest Obviousness” need not remain unchanged for all time.

New discoveries or events can come along that justify a differing decision.

If the participants bring before the Court circumstances that have not yet been taken into consideration, the matter deemed manifestly obvious can be refuted,  and a renewed presentation of evidence concerning the facts of the case will become necessary.

This way, the accused and the defense have the possibility of bringing about, through well founded presentation the taking of evidence on facts that are manifestly obvious as well.

Thus the decision about the “manifest obviousness” of a fact is entirely dependent on the particular acknowledging Court  and left to the independent judgment of the jurists.

Furthermore, in separate trials, entirely different decisions can result.

Whoever holds the opinion that “Holocaust” can not under any circumstances be doubted (more precisely, receive official permission to be doubted), must be able to explain the basis of his opinion.

Who would be able to (or even want to) maintain an opinion for which he did not need to state a reason?

Only God can do such a thing, if we believe in Him.

But the Jews are not God, although we sometimes have the impression that they think they are.

On the contrary:  Jesus called them “Children of the devil” and called their father “a murderer since the beginning” and “the father of lies” (John 8:44 )

Do these OMF jurists intend to deliver the Germans to the children of the devil and their lies?

Most of them are themselves of German blood, and the basic trait of being German is honesty.

We have this in our blood.

Therefore:  dare to be honest!

Regardless of how often “Holocaust” jurists may argue in future

that evidentiary motions which serve to refute the doctrine of “Manifest Obviousness” are inadmissible conduct on the part of the of defense and should therefore  be punished as “Holocaust Denial,” we dare to throw into their faces, before the whole world, that they –- whether from capriciousness, cowardice or maliciousness -- are themselves nothing more than common criminals.

These collaborators are exercising an arbitrary power against our nation that has been bestowed upon them by our enemy, thereby contributing to the success of his intent.

Our relentless foe is determined to destroy our very soul, killing it with lies about gas chambers.

We Germans – that is, we Germans who still want to be German, and who remain loyal to the Reich – refuse to obey those whom we know to be murderers of the German soul.

It was my duty as well as my legal right to do everything – I mean everything – in order to awaken in Dr. Meinerzhagen and colleagues doubt about “Holocaust” or better yet, to convince them that the doctrine of Manifest Obviousness of “Holocaust” has been a deception from the very beginning.

As presiding judge, Dr. Meinerzhagen is now suffering the consequence 

that his bending of the law, committed in the bright light of day, is obvious to the public.

How does he hope to exonerate himself?

Will he pretend to be too dumb to understand the intellectual process involved here?

I doubt that.

Can the judges of the Third Court of Appeals of the Superior District Court exculpate themselves with the excuse that they are unable to think logically?

Probably not.

We see through you.

Don’t believe that we will wait to call a thief a thief until he agrees to be called a thief!

When we look at you, we know with whom we are dealing.

You have chosen to take the side of our enemy.

You have made yourselves willing slaves of the oppressor of the German people.

But if this realization causes you to blush with shame, there is still hope for you / as sons and daughters  of the German Nation.

The Sixth Criminal Court ruling dated 7 November 2005 states its intention to disallow reading of the duly announced motions.

Dr. Meinerzhagen and his colleagues were pleased to designate these motions as “Incitement,” and stated their intention to “emphatically reject” any attempt to publicly spread such “Incitement.”

They have rigorously put their intention into action; in so doing, they have crossed the Rubicon of a show trial.

What does the attorney for the defense do when, on the basis of his professional expertise, he realizes that the jurists, in concert with the foreign rulers of the country, have conspired to plan a “lynch party?”

Shouldn’t the candidates for the lynching try, with all their strength, to break the silence in order to wake the populace and call them to their assistance?

Isn’t it the very point of  public and oral proceedings in criminal trials that, when dire emergency arises, their cries of “Murder and Mayhem” can be heard, understood and passed on?

The defense could have but one tactic against Dr. Meinerzhagen and colleagues: to make public the “show” nature of this trial.

This was my motive: not to hinder the determination of truth, but to make it possible.

Do the district judges of Karlsruhe claim to have not realized that?

It is all too obvious:

When “Holocaust” is invoked, OMF jurists cease to think.

Well, what did you learn in law school?

Are you unable to distinguish between right and wrong, justice and injustice?

Are you unable to perceive the sophisticated methods the Jews are using to attack German legal thought, down to its very roots?

It is time for you to comprehend what a gamut the truth is forced to run in our country!

The chain of repression grows ever longer:

1.       Section 130 Paragraph 3 of the Penal Code was designed to hinder public utterance of the truth.

2.       If this prohibition is violated just one time, the evildoer is hauled before the court where he and his defender are threatened with novel punishments, and now they are forbidden to follow the principle that lying is not allowed and only truth may be spoken in court.

3.       If this denial of the truth is ignored as well, then the public is effectively (in the Talmudic manner) shut out, by compelling both the accused and his attorney to submit in writing whatever defense they present, and disallowing open and public oral presentations.

4.       Incredibly, this is still not enough for the Mannheim Criminal Court.

It wants to burden even this  “Submissionsverteidigung” (submission defense) with threat of punishment. 

“Motions that might incite the masses” – that is, are motions debunking the Manifest Obviousness of “Holocaust” -- now lead to punishment, even if read in nonpublic negotiations, or submitted to the Court in written form.[16]

Why are they doing all this?

It is because “The Court has to deal with these motions in making its decisions  about the motions and reaching its verdict, both of which must be announced publicly (Section 173 Par. 1 GVG).

In this way the essential content of these motions would become known even if the public had been excluded during their submission, and they would have the effect of disturbing the peace.”[17]

This in turn creates the criminal act of Volksverhetzung in mittelbarer Täterschaft (Incitement Through Indirect Participation in a Crime)!”

In this novel transgression the Unmittelbarer Täter (immediate or direct culprit) is the Court itself since, as required by law, it publicly discusses and elucidates  the contents of legal motions.

The Mittelbarer Täter (accessory) is the attorney for the defense, who presents and thereby disseminates “inciting“ evidentiary motions before the Court!

Thus the judicial system of the OMF-BRD has liquidated itself.

It is necessary to introduce here what I attempted to introduce in my response to the charges against Ernst Zündel in the main proceedings, when my presentation was interrupted by Dr. Meinerzhagen.

I recapitulate these here, with some supplements:

Every judicial layperson with a primary education should be able to understand  the arguments developed here, as well as the significance of the results for the Zündel trial…

The signers of the court order of 7 November 2005, Dr. Meinerzhagen, Hamm and Mrs. Krebs-Dörr have aligned themselves with the tradition of the “International Military Tribunal” set up by the victors over the German Reich, who agreed among themselves “drop the discussion of whether the proceedings of IMT were violations of International Law or not.”

They decided to declare  “what international law is, so that there will be no discussion of whether it is international law or not.”[18]

The persons responsible for that field day of atrocity propaganda had turned their backs on any search for truth and any consideration of justice.

They were interested only in lending the appearance of some kind of justice their brutal and disgraceful murders of  the leading personalities of the Reich…

In the motion of 18 October 2005 (page 26), the undersigned announced

that the defense would attack the dogma of Manifest Obviousness of “Holocaust” with all means at her disposal and demonstrate that this dogma is pretense and propaganda manufactured by Germany ’s enemies as part of their perpetual war against the Reich.

The above named jurists used my procedural announcement as a pretext to formulate and introduce their deceitful conduct of the main proceedings as follows:

“Insofar as it attacks  the manifest obviousness of the Holocaust, the motion relies on familiar pseudo arguments offered  by so called revisionists past and present (see Supreme Court St 47, 278.)

These pseudo arguments do not refute the clearly proven, therefore manifestly obvious genocide, particularly against Jews, that took place under the National Socialist dictatorship (Rspr. Bundesverfassungsgericht und Bundesgerichthof, see BVerfGE 90, 241, 249; BGHSt 40,97, 99,; 46, 36, 46 f.; 47, 278)

Regarding the body of facts in the case, this genocide is assumed in Section 130 III of the Penal Code, therefore all evidence offered in denial is disallowed (BGHSt a.a.O.)

With this, Dr. Meinerzhagen and his colleagues unmistakably abandon the dogma of “Manifest Obviousness.”

That is the good news.

The bad news is their refusal to allow evidence despite the collapsed dogma of Manifest Obviousness of “Holocaust.”

What is going on in the heads of these jurists?

What are “show arguments?”

In the context of the Nuremberg Show Trials, “Show Arguments” are apparently arguments that might be capable of proving a verdict rendered in compliance with the will of foreign rulers, to be unjust.

For that reason such arguments must be suppressed.

And what are “familiar” Show Arguments?

“Familiar” Show Arguments are apparently those to which judicial arbitrariness has been successfully applied in the past.  

And what are “tatbestandliche Voraussetzungen” (presuppositions concerning the facts of the case)?

Presuppositions regarding the facts of the case, means nothing less than abandonment of the penal code, just as the term implies.

In criminal law, punishment is court ordered compensation for a debt, just as debt is a deficit that should not appear in a transaction.

If there is no transaction there obviously can be no debt.

In order to distinguish terror from legal punishment, the penal code designates transactions as punishable by labeling them “Tatbestandsmerkmale“ (characteristics of culpability), thereby separating them from permissible activity.

The culpability characteristics extend to the transaction in the narrower sense of an act or failure to act, as well as accompanying circumstances that are significant for determination of the demerit.

In a narrower sense, the action classified in Section 130 Paragraph 3 of the Penal Code is an expression of opinion.

The circumstance accompanying the demerit is a certain contemporary historical event (“called ‘Holocaust.”)

It is the task of the judge to determine the accompanying circumstances involved in the case.  In the present instance this consists of a certain expression of opinion with its accompanying circumstances.  The judge must determine what is to be considered as “given” and whether the facts of the case correspond to any action that can be classified as punishable.  

The citizen under law can adapt his intent to avoidance of the classified action.

The statement of facts of a punishment norm also guarantees the freedom from punishment of actions that do not meet the criteria of punishable (nulla poena sine lege – “no punishment without law.”)

Within the realm of actions classified as nonpunishable, one can live free from fear of being punished. 

This is what distinguishes a nation of laws from tyranny.

The statute of the victors’ tribunal at Nuremberg violated this basic principle (and that is unanimous opinion.)  

Egged on by the High Court of the OMF, Dr. Mein